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Office of the U.S. Courts. Although critics worry that the Chief may use his 
appointment role to shape Third Branch policy unduly, scholars view the 
role as constitutionally benign. 
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but not the Chief Justice. History teaches that this was a deliberate choice 
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the nation’s first Chief, John Jay, scrupulously adhered. After tracing the 
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Each year, the Chief Justice of the United States makes a variety of 
appointments to offices in the Article III bureaucracy, filling positions high 
and low.1 In 2011, for example, Chief Justice John G. Roberts participated 
 
1 In recent years, the role of the Chief Justice as the judiciary’s administrator in chief has attracted 
growing scholarly attention. For a sense of the literature, see Todd E. Pettys, Choosing a Chief Justice: 
Presidential Prerogative or a Job for the Court?, 22 J.L. & POL. 231 (2006); Judith Resnik & Lane 
Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the 
United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006), exploring the Chief’s various powers and questioning 
whether they should vest in a single Justice or be shared; Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial 
Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 (2004) [hereinafter Ruger, 
Appointment Power], detailing the wide-ranging appointment power of the Chief; Theodore W. Ruger, 
The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551 
(2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical 
Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Ruger, FISA], analyzing the Chief’s 
appointments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court; and Peter G. Fish, The Office 
of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judiciary’s Bicentennial Decade, in THE WHITE 
BURKETT MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE (1984) [hereinafter THE 
OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE], tracing the growth of the Chief’s administrative authority during the 
twentieth century. A variety of factors contribute to the interest. For starters, scholars often view the 
judicial behavior of federal judges in general and the Chief in particular as an outgrowth of their 
political views. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Scholars devoted to the attitudinal model may find a political undertone 
to the exercise of the Chief’s appointment powers. Moreover, scholars have suggested that Justices may 
time their retirements to ensure that a president of their own party will choose their successor. See, e.g., 
Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction, in 
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 3, 7 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul 
D. Carrington eds., 2006) (raising the prospect of strategic retirement in support of term limits for 
Supreme Court Justices); cf. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices 
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in the appointment of a new director of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), 
the research and teaching arm of the federal judiciary.2 And with the 2011 
retirement of the head of the Administrative Office (AO) of the United 
States Courts, the Chief Justice bore sole responsibility for the appointment 
of a successor.3 Apart from these bureaucratic figures, the Chief Justice 
also selects the Article III judges, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges who 
serve on the various committees of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the policymaking body of the federal judiciary over which he 
presides at biannual meetings. Finally, the Chief chooses sitting judges to 
staff specialty courts, such as the courts established in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Whatever their influence on the 
resolution of the cases that come before specialized courts, the Chief’s 
appointment powers may give him a significant hand in the development of 
Judicial Branch policy.4 
 
Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2012) (careful study casts doubt on strategic retirement theory); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, 
Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1432–36 (2005) 
(collecting evidence that tends to refute the strategic retirement thesis). To the extent the strategic 
retirement thesis explains the behavior of Chief Justices, critics may worry that the Chief’s 
administrative powers will remain in one party’s hands for the foreseeable future. 
2 Created in 1967 as the research and training department of the federal judiciary, the Federal 
Judicial Center operates under the direction of a board of directors. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2006). 
The Judicial Conference elects the members of the board from federal judges serving in the circuit, 
district, bankruptcy, and magistrate ranks; the Chief Justice serves as the chair. See id. §§ 620–621. For 
a history of the FJC, see Tom C. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537. The FJC 
board selected Judge Jeremy D. Fogel as its director effective October 2011. Judicial Administration 
and Organization, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_07_01.html 
(last visited May 24, 2013). 
3 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) was established in 1939 as the 
administrative arm of the federal judiciary. For an account of the AO’s origins, see Peter Graham Fish, 
Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599 
(1970). For a critique of the judicial bureaucracy, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as 
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000), questioning the 
bureaucratic role of life-tenured judges and their influence on the legislative process. Federal law 
assigns the power to appoint and remove the director of the AO to the Chief Justice. See § 601 (vesting 
in the Chief Justice the power to appoint and remove the director and deputy director of the AO, “after 
consulting with the Judicial Conference”). Chief Justice Roberts selected Thomas Hogan, a senior 
federal district judge from the District of Columbia, as the AO’s new director, effective October 2011. 
See New Director of AO Appointed, THIRD BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
TheThirdBranch/11-10-01/New_Director_of_AO_Appointed.aspx. 
4 For accounts of the changing makeup of the civil rules advisory committee from one initially 
comprised of lawyers and law professors to one now dominated by judges, see Stephen B. Burbank, 
Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1714–26 (2004), 
assessing scholarship that models the rulemaking process from a public choice perspective. For an 
evaluation of the Chief Justice’s use of the appointment power to influence the politics of civil justice 
reform within the Article III judiciary, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil 
Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 614–23 (2001), providing a case study of civil 
justice reform that highlights the Chief’s influence on the process. On the way assignment power can be 
used as a lever to influence outcomes, see J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A 
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Despite the familiarity of the practice, the power of Congress to vest 
the Chief with appointment authority poses a constitutional puzzle. After 
setting a default rule of presidential nomination and appointment, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, Article II empowers Congress to 
vest the appointment of “inferior” officers in the President acting alone, in 
the heads of departments, and in the “Courts of Law.”5 Notably, Article II 
makes no provision for the assignment of appointment authority to the 
Chief Justice, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution elsewhere 
recognizes the existence of that official (in the provision that calls for the 
Chief to preside at the Senate’s trial of presidential impeachments).6 So 
long as the Judicial Branch offices in question qualify as “inferior” within 
the meaning of Article II, the Constitution appears to foreclose the vesting 
of appointment authority in the Chief and to require its vesting in the Court 
instead.7 
Although scholars have criticized modern appointment practices in the 
Judicial Branch, the scholarly consensus holds that the vesting of 
appointment authority in the Chief does not violate the Constitution. In the 
leading assessment of the Chief’s appointment power, Professor Theodore 
Ruger concludes that the practice is not “unconstitutional” in the modern 
sense that a federal court should invalidate legislation conveying such 
power.8 He bases this conclusion on a variety of considerations, including 
the gradual growth in the powers of the Chief over time and the plausible 
textual case for treating the “court of law” as synonymous with the Chief 
Justice of that court. As Professor Ruger notes, district courts in the 
nineteenth century often employed a single district judge, making the 
 
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 724–28 (1994), examining the use of the assignment 
power to influence the way judges decide cases in Japan. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a selection of the vast literature on the separation of powers and 
the role of the Appointments Clause, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008), tracing the exercise 
of presidential power over time to assess its consistency with the unitary executive thesis; Steven G. 
Calabresi & Joan E. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of 
Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); and John F. Manning, 
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011), arguing against the 
use of presumptions in resolving disputes over the separation of powers. 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
7 As we shall see, early practice at the Supreme Court makes clear that court clerks are to be 
regarded as inferior officers within the meaning of this provision. See infra text accompanying notes 
153–66; see also Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 243 (1839) (treating the district court clerk as 
an inferior officer). The Court itself has held that special judges appointed to serve on the Tax Court 
qualify as inferior officers rather than employees. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991). 
8 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 351, 367–70. 
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“court” and the “judge” one and the same.9 Ruger also points to Freytag v. 
Commissioner,10 which upheld the power of the chief judge of the Tax 
Court to appoint inferior officers to serve as special judges on that court. 
Although the Court divided on one interpretive issue,11 Ruger notes that the 
Court “had no trouble” with the exercise of the appointing authority by the 
chief judge of the Tax Court rather than by the court itself.12 Professor 
Ruger’s analysis may have helped to persuade Professor Resnik that the 
Chief Justice’s appointment powers were, as she and Lane Dilg concluded, 
unwise, but not unconstitutional.13 
In this Article, I explore the possibility that, notwithstanding scholarly 
consensus and entrenched practice, the text of the Constitution may well 
mean what it says in authorizing the Court, as a “court of law,” but not the 
Chief Justice to serve as an approved recipient of the power to appoint 
inferior officers. There are two reasons to believe this might be so, one 
historical and one structural. As for history, the evidence suggests that the 
decision to authorize the assignment of appointment power to the courts, 
instead of the judges who staff them, may have been part of a wide-ranging 
effort during the early republic to rethink the nature and perquisites of 
judicial office.14 Throughout the eighteenth century, judicial officers earned 
income from salary, from fees paid by litigants who appeared before the 
court, and from the sale of inferior offices within the “gift” or patronage 
power of the judge.15 Nonsalary perquisites grew controversial during the 
run-up to the Revolution, as the colonists chafed under the burden of 
 
9 See id. at 369 (treating the reference to “Courts of Law” as a distinction without a difference in 
light of the practice of staffing district courts with a single judge); see also Fish, supra note 1 (noting 
the district court analogy). 
10 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
11 As Ruger observes, the debate in Freytag focused on the majority’s conclusion that Congress 
could invest the non-Article III Tax Court with the appointment power; the concurring opinion of 
Justice Scalia argued that Article III courts alone could be given such power. Nonetheless, Justice 
Scalia would have upheld the appointments by envisioning the Tax Court as the head of an executive 
department. See id. at 920 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). But cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010) (concluding that a multimember board could 
act as a department “head” within the meaning of Article III). 
12 Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 370. Perhaps the Justices’ awareness of their own 
Chief’s appointing role (and their reluctance to cast doubt on its propriety) helped to generate the 
unarticulated consensus. 
13 See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1619 n.188. 
14 See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early 
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008) (finding that by 1787, frustration and criticisms of fee-based 
judicial compensation had resulted in state statutes and constitutional provisions addressing the matter).  
15 See Part III.A–B. For an account, see DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727–
1875: THE RESHAPING OF A PROFESSIONAL ELITE (1982). A tabular presentation of the value of office 
sales in England, drawn from Duman’s work, appears below at Table 1. 
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multiple fee-paid offices.16 Among the more colorful indictments in the 
Declaration of Independence was its claim that the Crown “has erected a 
multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our 
people, and eat out their substance.”17 
Earlier work contends that Article III may have presumptively 
foreclosed the practice of allowing federal judges to collect fees from the 
litigants who appear before the federal courts.18 Article II may complement 
the no-fees assumptions of Article III19 by adding a no-office-sales proviso 
that prevents judges from securing additional compensation through the 
exercise of patronage power over appointments to inferior offices. By 
providing for Congress to vest the appointment power in courts, the 
Framers of Article II neatly clarified that the act of appointment was to be a 
transparent part of the public work of the court. By depriving the chief or 
any individual judge of the appointment power, moreover, the provision 
may have signaled a desire to foreclose the sale of inferior office for private 
gain. As was the case with the early implementation of the compensation 
provisions of Article III, which featured a move away from fee-paid 
compensation,20 Congress implemented the Article II limitation in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 by assigning appointment powers to courts rather 
than judges in keeping with this new conception of the judicial office as a 
public trust.21 Early practice, overseen by the nation’s first Chief Justice, 
John Jay, confirms the perceived importance of court-based appointments. 
The structural argument complements the historical evidence. Article 
III creates a single Supreme Court, places it atop the federal judicial 
hierarchy, and requires all other courts and tribunals erected or appointed 
by Congress to remain inferior to that Court. As noted elsewhere, the 
related requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority together suggest 
that the Court must retain the power to oversee the work of the judicial 
 
16 In addition to salary, colonial governors could earn substantial, additional income from judicial 
and administrative fees. Lower officeholders often received fee payments as well from sources such as 
marriage fees and liquor license fees. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 8–9 & nn.34–37. 
17 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). For an account, see EDWARD 
DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 115–17 (1950), 
detailing the British government’s creation of new courts of admiralty and commissioners of customs in 
the colonies, the fees they were paid, and the subsequent colonial protests that inspired the indictment. 
18 See Pfander, supra note 14, at 4, 14.  
19 See id. at 16–19 & nn.73–91 (offering textual and historical evidence that Article III precludes 
fee-based compensation and recounting an exchange between Gouverneur Morris and James Madison 
at the Constitutional Convention that appears to assume salary-based judicial compensation). 
20 See id. at 24–26 (describing federal law that allowed federal officials to collect fees at the same 
rate as state officials but specifically foreclosed payment of “fees to judges”). 
21 See Karen Orren, The Work of Government: Recovering the Discourse of Office in Marbury v. 
Madison, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 60 (1994) (recounting changes in the conception of office as property 
that began during the early republic). 
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system.22 These powers of oversight may extend to state courts, when 
constituted as tribunals within the meaning of Article I,23 to federal 
agencies exercising judicial power,24 and to lower federal courts,25 and may 
well encompass a power to review lower court decisions in the wake of 
congressional restrictions on the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction.26 
Under Article III, the Court bears ultimate responsibility for the way in 
which the judicial department exercises the judicial power of the United 
States.27 
The appointment provision of Article II underscores the Court’s 
special role as the head of the federal judicial department by providing that 
Congress can assign the appointment of inferior officers to courts of law. 
An inferior officer must be inferior to a superior and Article III makes clear 
that the Court, rather than the Chief Justice, occupies the relevant position 
of superiority. The Court’s departmental supremacy explains why one 
cannot defend current arrangements by regarding the Chief Justice as the 
“Head[] of [a] Department” within the meaning of Article II. Such a view 
would portray the FJC, the AO, and the other components of the Article III 
bureaucracy as separate administrative agencies over which the Chief 
exercises administrative oversight. But while Congress has the power to 
create department heads with appointment power, such officials must 
report to a superior official or body and ultimately to the President. For the 
Chief Justice, acting within the judicial department, the relevant reporting 
obligation runs not to the President but to the Supreme Court itself. 
 
22 See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL 
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (2009) (making a general argument that all federal tribunals must 
remain inferior to the Supreme Court and subject to its oversight and control); James E. Pfander & 
Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2011) (exploring the 
Scottish antecedents to the hierarchical features of the Article III judiciary).  
23 See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s supremacy 
operates in relation to state courts). 
24 See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the 
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (arguing that Article I tribunals must remain inferior to 
the federal judiciary and ultimately to the Supreme Court). 
25 See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise 
Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000). 
26 See Pfander, supra note 23, at 237 (arguing that as a result of jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
that denies inferior federal courts jurisdiction over specific federal claims, state courts technically 
become federal tribunals with original jurisdiction subject to Supreme Court oversight); see also 
Pfander & Birk, supra note 22, at 1622–23 (exploring the growing view that Congress may alter the 
Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction but may not “deprive the Court of the discretionary oversight 
that inheres in its supremacy”). 
27 The Court’s own decisions offer important support for this conception of the Court as the final 
exponent of the judicial department’s exercise of judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“Within that [judicial] hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not 
(unless the time for appeal has expired) the final word of the department as a whole.”). 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly sketches the Chief’s 
appointment powers, explores some of the criticisms their exercise has 
attracted, and examines the defense of their constitutionality. Part II 
examines the origins and early implementation of Article II’s provision for 
appointments by “courts of law,” placing the provision in the context of 
post-revolutionary disdain for the corrupt office selling and fee-based 
compensation of the English and colonial judicial systems. Part II explores 
the history of the Court’s early practice, which was consistently court 
centered, and links the provision for appointment by the courts to the 
hierarchical structure of the third branch of government, which calls for the 
Court to oversee the department’s exercise of the judicial function. Part III 
returns to the constitutional puzzle, showing that the combined force of 
history and structure cast doubt on the Chief’s role. After assessing some 
possible work-arounds and concluding that they fail to address the 
concerns, Part III concludes with some thoughts on how to make the 
transition from a Chief-based system of appointments to one in which the 
Court performs an oversight function. 
I. THE APPOINTMENT POWERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Congress has given the Chief Justice of the United States power to fill 
a wide range of offices within the judicial bureaucracy. In addition to his 
power to appoint such figures as the director of the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts, the Chief serves as the chair of the board of 
directors of the Federal Judicial Center and plays a role in selection of the 
FJC’s director.28 For help with various administrative chores, the Chief also 
appoints an administrative assistant who works at the Supreme Court.29 
Depending on the Chief, the administrative assistant can play a substantial 
role in the development of Judicial Branch policy.30 Chief Justice Burger, in 
particular, was thought to have delegated significant authority to his 
administrative assistant, Mark Cannon.31 
 
28 28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he Chief Justice of the United States, who shall be the 
permanent Chairman of the Board . . . .”); id. § 624 (“The Board is authorized . . . to appoint and fix the 
duties of the Director and the Deputy Director of the Federal Judicial Center, who shall serve at the 
pleasure of the board . . . .”). 
29 See id. § 677(a)–(b); Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1590 & nn.45–46 (discussing the creation 
of the administrative assistant position at Chief Justice Burger’s request through § 677 (a)–(b)). 
30 While Chief Justice Burger’s administrative assistant served from the creation of the position to 
the end of Burger’s tenure, a period of fourteen years, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited the tenures of his 
administrative assistants to two- to five-year terms. Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1623–24 & n.211. 
31 Id. at 1623–24 & n.210 (citing concern with Cannon’s authority as a factor in Justice Rehnquist’s 
decision to impose term limits on his assistants). In Cannon’s own description of his duties, see Mark 
W. Cannon, Judicial Administration: Why Should We Care?, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 521, 531–32, he lists: 
maintain relations with the bureaucracy, advise the Chief, brief the Chief on the literature, and relieve 
the Chief of “administrative detail.” 
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In addition to the power to appoint officials within the judicial 
bureaucracy, the Chief exercises control over the appointment of the 
members of the committees that do much of the initial work in formulating 
policy for the Article III judiciary.32 Formal policymaking responsibility 
falls to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which meets in March 
and September every year.33 The Chief presides at meetings of the Judicial 
Conference but does not pick its members.34 According to statute, the 
Conference consists of the chief judge of each circuit court of appeals, a 
district judge from each regional circuit (elected by a vote of her peers), 
and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade.35 Between the 
March and September meetings, the Conference acts through an executive 
committee made up of seven members of the Conference, which the Chief 
appoints.36 
The formulation of Judicial Conference policy begins at the committee 
level. The Conference consists of some two dozen committees, each of 
which has jurisdiction over a specific set of issues and each of which 
consists of a number of Article III judges who meet biannually.37 Best 
known, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
presides over a variety of rulemaking committees, such as those that work 
up recommended amendments to the rules of civil procedure, appellate 
procedure, bankruptcy procedure, criminal procedure, and so forth.38 Less 
 
32 For a count of Judicial Conference committees, putting the number at twenty-five in 2009, see 
Burbank et al., supra note 1. See also Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1597 (finding that though statute 
only grants the Chief Justice authority to appoint members of the Standing Committee, the Chief Justice 
appoints the members of the various rules committees). 
33 See Sessions, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Sessions
.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013). 
34 § 331 (“[The Chief Justice] shall preside at such conference which shall be known as the Judicial 
Conference . . . .”). 
35 Id. 
36 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last 
visited May 24, 2013) (“The seven-member Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference serves as 
the senior executive arm of the Conference . . . .”). The director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts serves as an ex-officio, nonvoting member of the Executive Committee and brings 
the roster total to eight. See Organization, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
JudicialConference/Organization.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013); see also Two New Members Named 
to Judicial Conference’s Executive Committee, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/News/NewsView/10-12-28/Two_New_Members_Named_to_Judicial_Conference’s_Executive_
Committee.aspx (listing the number of committee members as eight and including the AO director). 
37 See Federal Court Governance and Administration: National, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.
fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/FCGA1 (last visited May 24, 2013); see also Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 
1597 & n.81 (detailing the “more than two dozen” Judicial Conference committees as of 2006). 
38 See Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
and Its Advisory Rules Committees, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, VOL. 1, § 440.10, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Procedures_for_Rules_Cmtes.pdf (requiring the 
Judicial Conference “to publish the procedures that govern the work of the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (the ‘Standing Committee’) and its advisory committees on the Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure and on the Evidence Rules”). 
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well-known committees oversee such matters as court administration, 
courthouse construction, federal–state jurisdiction, the federal defenders 
program, and magistrate judges.39 Acting on recommendations from the 
director of the AO, the Chief appoints the chair and all of the members of 
these committees. Committee members serve for three-year terms with the 
prospect, often realized,40 of reappointment to a second three-year term.41 In 
a typical year, the Chief may make some ten to fifteen such appointments.42 
The Chief also appoints the judges who sit on several specialty courts 
in the United States. Perhaps most visibly, the Chief appoints members of 
the two courts identified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.43 
Such courts sit to review, in the first instance and on appeal, the 
government’s ex parte applications for warrants to conduct specified kinds 
of electronic surveillance.44 The judges of these FISA courts, drawn from 
the ranks of active Article III judges, typically serve for a term of seven 
years.45 They often meet at a secure location at the Department of Justice in 
Washington, D.C.46 Other specialty courts to which the Chief makes term-
limited appointments include the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
and the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.47 
 
39 See, e.g., Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. CTS. 
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.
aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/2011-09.pdf (recording the activities of several 
of these committees at the September 2011 meeting). 
40 In September of 2011, Chief Justice Roberts extended the terms of the chairs of the Committee 
on Defender Services, Committee on Information Technology, and Committee on Intercircuit 
Assignments. See, e.g., Carlyn Kolker, Chief Justice Names Judges to Policy Group Posts, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/09_-_
September/Chief_justice_names_judges_to_policy_group_posts. 
41 See Committees, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/
Committees.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013) (specifying term lengths and the option of reappointment). 
42 The Judicial Conference lists some seventeen committee members whose terms began in 2011. 
See Committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 2011), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2011_Rules_Comms.pdf; see also Kolker, supra note 40 
(reporting the appointment of eight committee members and the renewal of three committee members’ 
terms in September 2011). 
43 50 U.S.C § 1803(a)–(b) (2006); see also Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 243–45 (describing the 
statutory history of the eleven-judge FISA court and the three judge FISA court of review). 
44 According to Ruger, the two FISA courts consider government requests for warrants under a 
specialized probable cause standard requiring a lesser showing of cause than that required under the 
Fourth Amendment standard. See Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 243–44 & nn.15–16.  
45 FISA court judges are limited to serving a single, staggered term. § 1803(d); Ruger, FISA, supra 
note 1, at 244. 
46 See § 1803(a) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall publicly designate 11 district court judges . . . of 
whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a 
court . . . .”). 
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2006) (“The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of 
seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice . . . .”). One can, of 
course, argue that the Judicial Panel exercises only a modest slice of Article III judicial power, passing 
on petitions for the transfer of civil actions with “one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in 
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Needless to say, the Chief today does not sell the offices over which 
he exercises appointment power. But critics have suggested that the Chief 
might use the appointment power to influence policy. Perhaps most 
significantly, critics argue that the Chief can staff specialty courts and 
Judicial Conference committees with an eye to selecting judges with an 
agreeable conception of sound judicial policy. Building on the attitudinal 
model of judicial behavior, some scholars believe that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist adopted a partisan approach to his judicial appointments.48 
Working on the assumption that the party of the nominating president 
reveals important information about the ideology of the judge, scholars 
have observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed more Republicans 
than Democrats to fill crucial judicial offices,49 particularly on the Special 
Division of the D.C. Circuit, which exercised control over the appointment 
of independent prosecutors.50 Whatever the validity of the attitudinal model 
in this (or other) contexts, the specter of a politicized appointment process 
will linger as long as the Chief makes the appointments himself.51 
Critics also worry that the Chief’s administrative responsibilities may 
inform his views as a judge on a multimember judicial body. As Professor 
Resnik has observed, Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to deny 
bankruptcy judges Article III status in the 1978 legislation that expanded 
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.52 Later, when parties to a breach 
of contract claim challenged the assignment of judicial power to 
bankruptcy judges with the non-Article III status he advocated, Chief 
Justice Burger defended the legislation from a constitutional challenge and 
 
different districts” to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings. See id. § 1407 (a)–(c). But it 
seems unlikely that Congress could assign the transfer function to a non-Article III tribunal. See 
Pfander, supra note 24, at 762–66 (highlighting a formalist strand of the Court’s Article III 
jurisprudence that would call into question an assignment of the transfer power to Article I tribunals). 
For the appointment provisions of the Alien and Terrorist Removal Court, see 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) 
(2006) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the United 
States judicial circuits . . . .”).  
48 In its strongest form, the attitudinal model holds that judges vote to advance their political 
ideology (or that of their appointing president) rather than to apply or refine the law. See SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 1. 
49 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 393, tbl.2 (listing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
appointments by party).  
50 See id. at 344, 379 n.156 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointment of Judge David 
Sentelle to lead the Special Division and the Division’s subsequent appointment of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate President Clinton). 
51 To be sure, vesting appointment power in the Court rather than the Chief would not necessarily 
eliminate the prospect of a politicized appointment process. Many regard the Court’s work today as 
highly political. But the give and take associated with the deliberative process on a collegial Court 
could bring greater perceived balance to the selection process. See infra text accompanying notes 240–
42. 
52 See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1611–12 (tracing Chief Justice Burger’s influence on 
Congress and the Administrative Office as the two entities negotiated the status of bankruptcy judges 
and their jurisdictional authority). 
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dissented from a decision invalidating the statute in part.53 A similar 
blurring of roles has been said to have occurred under the stewardship of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Chief worked within the judicial bureaucracy 
to articulate a policy of opposition to the expansion of federal criminal 
jurisdiction and then voted as a member of the Supreme Court to invalidate 
the Violence Against Women Act on the ground that it exceeded 
congressional power in criminalizing gender-based violence.54 Professor 
Resnik contends that, in each instance, views that the Chief formed as chief 
court administrator may have influenced the exercise of the Chief’s judicial 
function as a Justice of the Supreme Court.55 
Despite these criticisms, the weight of scholarly opinion holds that the 
Chief’s bureaucratic role should not be regarded as unconstitutional.56 A 
variety of considerations inform this constitutional consensus. First, the 
Chief’s powers have grown up over time, beginning in the nineteenth 
century, gaining momentum with the power Congress conferred on Chief 
Justice Taft to transfer judges between regions, and evolving into a practice 
so extensive that it could be difficult to uproot.57 Second, in the most nearly 
analogous case, Freytag, the Court upheld the power of Congress to allow 
the chief judge of the Tax Court to appoint judges of that body.58 While the 
Justices disagreed as to whether the non-Article III Tax Court would 
 
53 See id. at 1612 (quoting Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982), where he insisted that “a radical restructuring of the 
present system of bankruptcy adjudication” was not a necessary congressional response to the plurality 
decision). 
54 See id. at 1613 (arguing that the creation of the new cause of action spurred action by the Judicial 
Conference, presided over by the Chief Justice, to create the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based 
Violence to review the proposed legislation). For a full account, see Judith Resnik, The Programmatic 
Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 
269 (2000). 
55 Professor Resnik suggests that rather than speaking of the “Rehnquist Court,” scholars should 
refer to the period as the “Rehnquist Judiciary” in recognition of the Chief Justice’s broad influence 
over judiciary matters extending beyond adjudication. Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1615. One can, 
of course, question the claim that Chief Justice Rehnquist formed his view of the Violence Against 
Women Act in the course of his administrative work. The Rehnquist Court inaugurated a series of 
federalism-based restraints on congressional power in such cases as New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992), and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Chief Justice 
supported these restrictions and had long called on the Court to define limits on the commerce power. 
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579–80 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting).  
56 See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1; Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 368–372. 
57 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 350–51 (describing the Taft-era transfer 
authority as a precursor to the modern appointments to specialized courts). For an account of Chief 
Justice Taft’s efforts—largely successful—to create a more bureaucratized and independent judiciary, 
see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 199–212 (2012), describing Chief Justice Taft’s success in securing passage of the 
Judicial Conference Act and the Judiciary Act of 1925, which helped to transform the federal judiciary 
into a more hierarchical, institutionally self-sufficient branch. 
58 See infra notes 209–15 and accompanying text. 
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qualify as a “court of law” within the meaning of Article II, they did not 
contest the power of the chief judge to act for the court in making the 
appointments. This tendency to equate the court with the chief may explain 
the general perception that the Framers could not have meant to draw a 
sharp line between the administrative work of a multimember tribunal and 
the work of its senior member. 
Yet one can question each element of the constitutional consensus. 
While Chief Justice Taft certainly worked to expand the office of Chief 
Justice, likening it to the position of Lord Chancellor in England,59 one can 
point to an earlier practice quite at odds with Chief Justice Taft’s approach. 
As we will see, the precedent-conscious Chief Justice Jay took pains to 
ensure that the Court as such would act as the appointing agency for all 
inferior officers and deliberately declined to assert control over 
appointments himself.60 Chief Justice Jay’s early conduct in the office, 
moreover, appears to reflect a perception that the line between the Court, as 
the appointing agency, and the person holding the position of Chief Justice, 
was one of constitutional dimension.61 By calling for the court to appoint, 
rather than the chief judge, the Framers may have meant to signal that 
official appointments were a public trust rather than a perquisite within the 
gift of the Justices that could be exploited for private gain. The next Part 
explores the origins and early implementation of the provision for 
appointment by the “courts of law.” 
II. THE ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURTS OF  
LAW PROVISION 
The provision authorizing Congress to vest appointment authority in 
courts of law emerged late in the work of the Philadelphia Convention and 
attracted little attention in the ratification debates. Yet we have reason to 
believe that the choice of the court as the appointing entity was part of a 
series of decisions that sought to eliminate corrupting features from judicial 
office. In this part of the Article, I sketch the nature of judicial office in 
 
59 See CROWE, supra note 57, at 210 (describing England’s chancellor as Chief Justice Taft’s 
model judge). 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 147–59. For the view that early actions by the Supreme Court 
and other departments of the government set precedents that shape constitutional understanding, see 
Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1745, 1786–87 (2006), discussing the significance of early practice in defining the meaning of the 
Constitution and noting in particular Chief Justice Jay’s attitude toward the constitutionality of circuit 
riding, and Manning, supra note 5, at 2033–34 & n.469, describing the Jay Court’s refusal to issue 
advisory opinions as a foundational precedent. Manning describes the underlying logic as crediting an 
interpretation adopted soon after the enactment of a text in recognition that “[a]lterations in the legal 
and cultural landscape may make the meaning hard [for future generations] to recover.” Id. at 2033 
(alterations in original) (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)). 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 150–52.  
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eighteenth-century England and in the colonies, explaining why the 
reliance on fee-paid compensation and patronage-based appointments grew 
controversial among the members of the founding generation. I also 
explore the appointment provisions of the state constitutions, particularly 
those in New York, where the author of Article II (Gouverneur Morris) and 
the nation’s first Chief Justice, John Jay, wrestled with the problem of how 
to structure appointments of inferior judicial officers. Finally, I sketch the 
development of Article II, concluding that the choice of the court as the 
approved recipient of appointment power may have been meant to further 
the Framers’ decision to eliminate non-salary-based compensation for 
judges and to create a hierarchical judicial system with a single Supreme 
Court.62 
A. Judicial Office in England and the Colonies 
Judicial office in eighteenth-century England, at least for the lucky few 
who were appointed to serve on one of the three superior courts of common 
law or as chancellor, was a source of handsome financial reward.63 Chief 
judges in particular earned at least three sources of income, all of which 
were regarded as a species of property attached to the judicial office itself.64 
First, the judges were paid a salary. This had been a matter of some 
controversy; the Stuarts had claimed the right to pay the salary of their 
appointed judges and to commission them during pleasure.65 The Act of 
Settlement (1701) provided instead that the judges were to serve during 
good behavior (which meant they were not subject to at-will dismissal by 
the Crown) and that the salaries were to be paid by the Parliament.66 While 
often associated with judicial independence, the Act of Settlement might be 
 
62 The evidence collected here suggests that judges were among the first federal officials who were 
placed on salary and denied other perquisites of office. Nicholas Parrillo reports in a forthcoming book-
length treatment of the subject that salarization generally came much later for executive enforcement 
officers (like state and local tax investigators, custom-house investigators, prosecutors, prison 
managers, and so forth) and for Executive Branch adjudicators (like officers deciding applications for 
naturalizations, homesteads, or pensions). See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: 
THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (forthcoming 2013). 
63 The superior courts of common law, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, each 
employed four judges, one of whom was the chief judge (or justice) and the remainder of whom were 
associate (or puisne) judges. These twelve judges enjoyed tenure during good behavior under the Act of 
Settlement (1701). See James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1235 & 
n.37 (2007) (citing the Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2. (Eng.)).  
64 See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 111. 
65 See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 
1063–64 (2007). 
66 Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.); see Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 n.30 
(noting that the Act’s establishment of judicial salary did not preclude litigant fees).  
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viewed as expressing a preference for judicial dependence on Parliament 
rather than on the Crown.67 
Apart from salaries, superior court judges earned income in the form 
of fees, paid by litigants as part of the costs of litigation.68 Fees varied from 
court to court in terms of their corrupting influence. In the superior courts, 
the fees were paid by the losing party (in keeping with the loser-pays 
system in England) and thus did not tend to influence the outcome of the 
dispute.69 The judges were paid their fees no matter which way they ruled 
on the merits. In the court of admiralty, by contrast, judicial fees could 
depend on the outcome. Thus, admiralty judges earned substantial fees 
when they condemned a vessel as lawful prize but far less when they 
acquitted the vessel of wrongdoing.70 This incentive to condemn would 
violate due process today;71 it was no more popular in colonial America as 
the mode by which the vice-admiralty courts enforced various mercantile 
regulations.72 
Judges supplemented fees and salaries by exercising control over the 
appointment of individuals to offices within their gift.73 Judges with a 
 
67 See Martin Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English Experience, 55 N.C. L. REV. 577, 621–
22 (1977). 
68 Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing the different stages in the litigation process—including 
commencement, process, and jury empanelment—at which fees were incurred); see infra Table 1. 
69 Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 n.32 (discussing the origins of the loser pays system in England and 
contrasting the system to the “American” rule requiring that each party pay its own attorneys’ fees). 
70 See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 115 (noting the large disparities in British admiralty judges’ 
incomes during times of war and peace as a result of the cut judges received when granting an award in 
wartime prize cases; this led to an income increase of up to £5500 for the judges during wartime). 
71 See Pfander, supra note 14, at 10 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and Connally v. 
Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam), Supreme Court cases that invalidated a conviction and a 
warrant because the judges received a fee only when they convicted the defendant or issued the 
warrant). 
72 On the controversial character of the admiralty courts during the run-up to independence, see 
CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960), and 
David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–
1776, 16 WM & MARY Q. 459 (1959). 
73 On the origins of office sales in early Norman history, linking office to a form of feudal property 
and describing its corrupting influence, see 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
246–51 (7th ed. rev. 1956). For criticisms of the sale of office, see G.E. AYLMER, THE KING’S 
SERVANTS: THE CIVIL SERVICE OF CHARLES I 1625–1642, at 225–30 (rev. ed. 1974), describing the 
impeachment of Buckingham in 1626 for corrupt sale of office and setting forth a series of 
contemporary criticisms of the practice including the concern that wealth, rather than merit, would 
determine advancement. Efforts to reform the sale of office did not succeed in the early modern period, 
in part due to the wide range of exceptions; thus, an English act of Parliament in 1552 expressly saved 
the rights of the several chief justices to retain the proceeds of office sales. See AYLMER, supra, at 228. 
Reform efforts finally took hold in the early nineteenth century under the influence of Jeremy Bentham. 
See HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 248, 262–64 (describing the reforms and attributing them to Bentham). By 
the time the reform efforts gained steam, several inferior officers of King’s Bench enjoyed absolute 
sinecures; they did no work at all (having delegated it all to deputies who were also paid through the 
fees they collected). See id. at 257–59 (reporting that, by 1810, fifteen offices in the Court of King’s 
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substantial patronage in offices could secure revenue in two ways.74 They 
could sell the offices outright, bargaining with the purchaser in the 
expectation that the appointment to a sinecure would provide an annuity for 
the life of the individual installed.75 Alternatively, they could appoint a 
member of their own immediate or extended family to the post, thus 
ensuring that the income flowed to objects of the judge’s affection.76 The 
value of patronage obviously depended on the length of the appointing 
judge’s service; more offices would become vacant and require 
reappointment over the course of a long tenure on the bench. Like fees, this 
form of income was quite unevenly divided. While the Lord Chancellor 
and the two chief justices (those of King’s Bench and Common Pleas) 
derived substantial income from official patronage, the nine puisne (or 
associate) justices of the common law courts derived considerably less 
income from litigant fees and the sale of offices.77 
Historians have reckoned the value of these three sources of judicial 
income. According to Duman, at around the turn of the nineteenth century, 
the annual value of judicial office was as follows78: 
  
 
Bench were either absolute or partial sinecures). No wonder reformers complained of the law’s expense 
and delay. For an engaging defense of fee-paid office, see DOUGLAS W. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (2012), arguing that the sale of office was a plausibly efficient adaptation to a premodern 
world in which the measurement of official performance was quite difficult. 
74 See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 116 (detailing the patronage received by the chancellor, the chief 
justice of King’s Bench, and the chief justice of Common Pleas). 
75 If not sold outright, a judge might have chosen to keep the office for himself as a supplemental 
income. See id. 
76 Logically, the more prized offices were often gifted to close relatives or sons of the judges, while 
judges gave the less important offices to extended family and friends. See id. Even where the office was 
in the gift of a lower ranking figure, such as the Master of the Rolls in chancery, it was customary for 
the purchaser of an office to pay a douceur or brokerage fee to the chancellor. See AYLMER, supra note 
73, at 227.  
77 See infra Table 1. 
78 See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 105. 
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TABLE 1: ANNUAL VALUE OF ENGLISH JUDICIAL OFFICES CIRCA 1790 
Court Office Salary79 Fees Patronage Total 
Chancery 
Lord Chancellor £5000 £500080 £15,00081 £25,000 
Master of the Rolls £4000 £250082 £6900*83 £13,400 
King’s 
Bench 
Chief Justice £4000 £300084 £23,00085 £30,000 
Associate Justices £2400 £50086 – £2900 
Common 
Pleas 
Chief Justice £3500 £110087 £10,00088 £14,600 
Associate Justices £2400 – – £2400 
Exchequer 
Chief Baron £3500 – £420089 £7700 
Associate Barons £2400 – – £2400 
 
79 See id. at 112–13 tbl.9. Salary figures are based on Duman’s projections for the year 1790 for all 
offices except the Master of Rolls, whose salary is unknown for that year. The salary of the Master of 
Rolls is based on Duman’s figure from 1799. The salaries for associate justices of the King’s Bench, 
associate justices of the Court of Common Pleas, and the associate of the Exchequer are based on 
Duman’s projections for puisne judges and barons in 1790. 
80 Id. at 111. The Lord Chancellor’s remunerations were also augmented by income collected for 
serving as speaker of the house. In addition to the £5000 collected in fees, Lord Hardwicke received 
nearly £1100 per annum from 1736 and 1755 for officiating as speaker. Id. at 114. 
81 Id. at 116 (based on Duman’s finding of an 1810 House of Commons committee report 
documenting that the Lord Chancellor received £6391 for offices in his gift and that relatives of former 
chancellors held offices worth an additional £8790 per year). 
82 Id. at 114. From 1751–1753, the Master of the Rolls received an annual fee between £2400–
£2500 from the Hanaper Officer. 
83 Id. at 120. *Represents patronage figure for the first half of the eighteenth century for a total of 
thirteen offices. 
84 Id. at 119. 
85 Id. The patronage figure for the chief justice of the King’s Bench is based on Duman’s annual 
projection for the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries, which represents a period prior to England’s 
reformation of the patronage and sinecure system in England. 
86 Id. at 115 (based on an account by Sydney Stafford Smythe, a puisne judge during the reign of 
George I). The figure listed represents an average of fees from £426 in 1750 and £731 in 1754. 
87 Id. at 120. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (this figure is an estimate calculated by figuring the amount per office that the Master of Rolls 
received (£530) and multiplying this amount by the 8 officials the Chief Baron was able to appoint). For 
the Master of Rolls patronage figure, see supra note 83 and supra Table 1. 
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As these figures reveal, chief justices often earned more from fees and 
patronage than from straight salary. Not captured in these figures, though 
doubtless significant, royal pensions were often made available to judges 
after they retired.90 
Eventually, a reform-minded Parliament in the nineteenth century 
conducted investigations of fees and patronage and made changes in the 
rules.91 The general thrust of the reforms was to seek greater transparency 
and greater reliance on salary-based compensation. Viewing fees and 
patronage as sources of make-work and corruption that tended to delay and 
multiply the cost of judicial proceedings, Parliament attempted to wean the 
judges away from these sources of income.92 Reform-minded Americans 
beat their English cousins to the punch; many of the post-revolutionary 
state constitutions had already attempted to regulate the collection of 
official fees and perquisites of office.93 
B. Sale of Office in the Colonies and States 
The colonies of British North America had experience with fee-paid 
offices, with the use of the appointment power to influence political 
allegiance, and with the multiplication of offices aimed more at providing 
income to elites than services to the people. Governors earned a salary and 
a variety of fees, including fees for performing judicial functions.94 In 
addition, governors earned an income and a measure of influence through 
the disposition of the many offices in their gift.95 Some governors, in fact, 
never moved to America; they simply sold the office to a deputy and 
 
90 In particular, the chancellor and the two chief justices often received “royal patents,” which 
provided their retirement pensions. It was not until 1799 that an official pension system provided an 
annual pension of £4000 for the chancellor, £3000 for the chief justices and Chief Baron, £2500 for the 
Master of the Rolls, and £2000 for all other judges. See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 121, 124 n.49. 
Obviously, a pension system that was subject to some royal discretion could influence the behavior of 
judges seeking to ensure pension eligibility after retirement.  
91 See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 73, at 262 (finding that salary reform and the elimination of many 
sinecure offices were the immediate result of the publication of such investigations).  
92 Id. at 647 (“Payment by fees, saleable offices, and sinecure places were the predominant 
characteristics of a bureaucracy which could not be defended even upon historical grounds.”). 
93 See infra text accompanying notes 108–10. 
94 See 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA: 1713–1728, at 158–59 (William L. Saunders 
ed., 1886) [hereinafter RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA] (complaining that the governor is “by his 
Commission made Captain General, Chancellor, Chief Justice, and Admiral, which are great and 
different powers, and can never be justly executed by one person”); MICHAEL KAMMEN, COLONIAL 
NEW YORK: A HISTORY 201–02 (1975) (cataloging the range of salaries, fees, bribes and other 
perquisites collected by the colonial governor of New York). 
95 See 2 RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 94, at 159 (complaining that a governor who 
has obtained the office through influence, rather than merit, would sell “his judgments and decrees to 
the highest bidder, and all places both Civill and Millitary without any regard to the fitness of the 
persons to execute them . . . . He protects the inferior Officers and others who pay him yearly pencions, 
in the neglect and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and prosecutions against them are in 
vain.”). 
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collected a portion of the salary while living in England. The same was true 
of customs officials, who often sold the post to a deputy and stayed at 
home.96 
We lack a detailed history of the sale of office in British North 
America, but the evidence suggests that the practice was widespread and 
occasionally controversial. We have the following vivid set of grievances 
from the lower house of the Maryland assembly, which first criticized the 
governor for allowing excessive fees to be charged in connection with 
judicial proceedings and then added the following: 
[W]e cannot omit mentioning . . . another practice lately crept in amongst us 
that of Buying and selling the Offices of the County Clerks and the very 
persons who receive the Profits of the Offices of Clerks & Registers Practising 
as Attorneys in the Courts to which these Offices belong[. T]hat such Sales 
are unlawful is too obvious to be denied . . . .97 
Similar complaints arose in North Carolina and Massachusetts, where the 
people complained about governors who chose officials on the basis of 
corrupt considerations (rather than merit) and then protected the officials in 
question when the people complained about their incompetence.98 
Governors naturally objected to any intrusion on their powers of 
patronage. Historian Leonard Labaree recounts the story of one 
Massachusetts governor who was saddened to learn that London had 
appointed a naval officer for the province; the governor was forced to turn 
his own son-in-law out of the office and deny his children “so much 
bread.”99 But more than bread was at stake; governors felt that the 
efficiency of the administration depended on their ability to insist that 
subordinates do their jobs. Officeholders who held patents directly from 
London, rather than through the colonial governor, felt no sense of 
 
96 See LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH 
COLONIAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1783, at 102–04 (1930). Occasionally, controversies arose over fee-paid 
office and reliance on deputies to perform essential government functions. For example, one office 
holder complained about his suspension from office on the ground that he had paid good money for the 
position. See Letter from Samuel Johnston to North Carolina Governor Martin (Nov. 16, 1775), in 
10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA: 1775–1776, at 332–33 (William L. Saunders ed., 
1890) (“[T]he Office which I have for some years past executed under the Deputation of Mr. Turner 
was an honest purchase for which I have punctually paid an annual sum . . . .”). 
97 40 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: 1737–1740, at 392–93 (Bernard Christian Steiner ed., 1921). 
98 See CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 1 (1905) (recording the 
complaint of John Adams that Governor Frances Hutchinson of Massachusetts had passed over proper 
candidates in order to advance members of his own family); 2 RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra 
note 94, at 159 (criticizing the sale of offices “without any regard to the fitness of the persons to execute 
them” and noting that the governor protects inferior officers and others who pay yearly pensions “in the 
neglect and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and prosecutions against them are in vain”). 
99 LABAREE, supra note 96, at 105. 
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allegiance to, and little need to obey, the governor. Customs officials in 
particular were notably reluctant to follow gubernatorial advice.100 
One can see growing popular resentment of colonial patronage 
practices in the provisions of the great state papers that attended the 
movement to independence from Great Britain. For starters, the Declaration 
of Independence included the following complaint against the King’s 
patronage: “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither 
swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.”101 
Scholars agree that this vivid complaint attempts to convey popular 
discontent with the Crown’s tendency to use offices as sinecures for the 
benefit of “placemen.”102 Discontent with the corrupting influence of the 
appointment power also shows up in the Articles of Confederation of the 
newly independent states, which articulated an early version of the 
Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause: Article V prohibited delegates to the 
Continental Congress from “holding any office under the United States, for 
which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument 
of any kind.”103 Here one finds a reflection of two ideas: that office can 
corrupt the exercise of independent legislative judgment and that the 
corrupting influence of office can operate indirectly, by conferring valuable 
fees and emoluments on family members or others beholden to the 
delegate. 
State constitutions addressed the problem of official corruption in the 
appointment process through a variety of approaches. Some states 
responded by relying on the popular election of state and local officials or 
by placing the appointment power in the legislative branch of government, 
thus depriving civil officers of the appointment power and any share of 
patronage that the power had previously conferred. Georgia followed this 
approach.104 Some states authorized the executive and judicial branches of 
government to exercise some control over appointments but hemmed in 
those appointment powers in various ways. For example, Pennsylvania 
established an elected council to control the appointment of important 
 
100 Id. at 105–06. 
101 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). 
102 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 212 (1998 
ed.) (quoting William Henry Drayton speaking of the placemen as “strangers destitute of property and 
natural alliance in the Colonies” who create laws for a country “in which they have no interest but their 
commissions”); see also Pfander, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing colonial anger at officeholders who did 
little work to justify the fees they collected). The highlighted passage from the Declaration may also 
take issue with the Crown’s attempt to make the customs office more efficient by requiring the officials 
to move to North America to perform their office, rather than assigning the obligations to a do-nothing 
deputy. 
103 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2. 
104 See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIII (“All civil officers in each county shall be annually elected on 
the day of the general election, except justices of the peace and registers of probates, who shall be 
appointed by the house of assembly.”). 
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officers.105 Some states were unwilling to rely entirely on the structure of 
the appointment power to deal with corruption and abuse. In these states, 
the constitution included provisions that barred the holding of multiple 
offices and the receipt of fees and emoluments.106 These states were 
working out a new conception of judicial office in which the judge would 
receive a fixed or stated salary and would not be entitled to fees and 
perquisites of office.107 
Maryland’s constitution provides a good example of the shift from a 
fee-paid office to one in which the salary was meant to provide full 
compensation. After providing for the payment of salaries, “liberal, but not 
profuse,” to the chancellor and other state judges, the Maryland 
constitution provided that “[n]o Chancellor or Judge ought to hold any 
other office civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”108 
By barring fees and perquisites, the provision apparently clarifies that the 
judges were not to receive fees from the litigants who appeared before 
them or perquisites in any form. A similar provision appeared in the 
Pennsylvania constitution, which provided fixed salaries for judges and 
prohibited them from holding any other office or receiving “fees or 
perquisites of any kind.”109 In both of these states, then, the judges were 
entitled only to their salary and were barred from receiving other sources of 
income from their office. Although the two constitutions do not so provide 
in terms, they would apparently prohibit judges from selling any inferior 
offices within their power; income of that sort would presumably qualify as 
a prohibited perquisite of office.110 
 
105 Under Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776, the executive included both a president and council. 
The council was made up of twelve men elected by freemen, and members served one- to three-year 
terms as opposed to the president’s annual election by the state’s assembly and the council. SCOTT 
DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER 281–82 & n.67 (2011). 
106 Article 10 of Connecticut’s 1818 Constitution explicitly prohibited judges from holding 
multiple offices. See id. at 154. Similarly, under Article 35 of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, 
no “Judge of the Supreme Court of Law or Equity, or Judge of Admiralty” could hold an additional 
office. Id. at 203. For a discussion of Maryland’s constitutional bar on fees and multiple office holding, 
see infra notes 108, 110.  
107 As a correspondent with those who framed the North Carolina Constitution, John Adams 
expressed his adamant views that the judiciary “[s]hould not have their Minds distracted with 
complicated jarring Interests . . . and . . . Salaries Should be fixed by Law.” See GERBER, supra note 
105, at 202. 
108 See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 30. 
109 See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 23 (“The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have 
fixed salaries . . . ; they shall not be allowed . . . to hold any other office civil or military, nor to take or 
receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”). 
110 The apparent ban on judicial sale of inferior office in Maryland appears to be confirmed by the 
restrictive nature of the provision that allows the “judges” of the superior courts to appoint their own 
clerks. The provision begins with a rather open-ended grant of authority, allowing “the judges of the 
general court and justices of the county courts” to “appoint the clerks of their respective courts.” But 
this provision appears to contemplate that the appointments will occur during a regular session of the 
court. During vacation, the period between regularly scheduled sessions of court, or removal of the 
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As for the appointment of inferior judicial officers, a range of different 
approaches prevailed, some of surprising intricacy. In Delaware, for 
example, the appointment of the judges was vested in the president and 
general assembly. But the appointment of a variety of inferior judicial 
officers, including the registers in chancery, the clerks of the Court of 
Common Pleas and orphans’ courts, and clerks of the peace, was vested in 
the president and privy council.111 Meanwhile, the appointment of the clerk 
of the supreme court was vested in the chief justice of that court and the 
appointment of the recorders of deeds was vested in the “Justices” of the 
Court of Common Pleas.112 At the same time, the Delaware constitution 
appears to have ruled out patronage-based appointments to inferior judicial 
office at least in part; it provided that the “Registers in Chancery and 
Clerks shall not be Justices of either of the said courts of which they are 
officers.”113 
Of all the constitutional experiments with the allocation of 
appointment power at the state level, perhaps the most significant occurred 
in New York. There, John Jay, Gouverneur Morris, and Robert Livingston 
collaborated in developing a provision that called for the creation of a 
general purpose council of appointment made up of four senators, one from 
each district, and the governor of the state.114 In addition to this general 
purpose mechanism, the New York constitution specified a mode for the 
appointment of court clerks and other judicial personnel: 
[T]he register and clerks in chancery be appointed by the chancellor; the 
clerks of the supreme court, by the judges of the said court; the clerk of the 
 
officer out of state, “the governor with the advice of the council may appoint and commission a fit and 
proper person to such vacant office respectively, to hold the same until the meeting of the next general 
court or county court, as the case may be.” See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 47. 
111 See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 12 (“The President and Privy Council shall appoint the Secretary, 
the Attorney General, Registers for the probate of wills and granting letters of administration, Registers 
in Chancery, Clerks of the Courts of Common Pleas and Orphans Courts, and Clerks of the 
Peace . . . .”). 
112 See id. art. 14 (“The Clerks of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Chief Justice 
thereof, and the Recorders of Deeds, by the Justices of the Courts of Common Pleas for each county 
severally . . . .”). 
113 Id. art. 12. 
114 See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIII (council, made up of four senators and the governor, given 
power to nominate and, with advice and consent of the legislative council, appoint all officers other 
than those with modes of appointment otherwise specified). For an account of the collaboration of Jay, 
Morris, and Livingston, see 1 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 122–23 (Boston, 
Gray & Bowen 1832), describing a meeting in Livingston’s rooms at which Jay presented a plan for the 
council and secured the support of Morris and Livingston. See also Arthur Paul Kaufman, The 
Constitutional Views of Gouverneur Morris 194–205 (June 30, 1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgetown University) (recounting the development of the council and Jay’s subsequent letter to 
Morris and Livingston). For an account of the subsequent history of the council of appointment, see 
FISH, supra note 98, at 86–91 (describing the way politicians used the council as a mechanism for 
patronage appointments, setting the stage for the spoils system). 
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court of probates, by the judge of the said court; and the register and marshal 
of the court of admiralty, by the judge of the admiralty.115 
Jay objected to this provision and argued in a letter sent to Morris and 
Livingston in the immediate aftermath of the New York constitution’s 
adoption that the judges were not a proper recipient of the power to appoint 
their own clerks. Taking a page from classic republican theory, Jay argued 
that the judges “will be tempted not only to give these appointments to their 
Children Brothers Relatives and Favorites, but to continue them in Office 
against the public Good.”116 Among other things, Jay worried that the 
judges would develop a “[p]artiality” to their appointees and would 
combine with them to “conceal[] . . . or excuse[] their mutual Defects or 
misdemeanours.”117 New York’s experience with vesting appointment 
power in the judges may have informed later developments. Ten years 
later, Gouverneur Morris was to draft the court-based appointment 
provision of Article II and, as we shall see below, Jay himself was to 
institute the practice of court-based appointments when he became the 
nation’s first Chief Justice. 
C. Framing the Courts of Law Provision in Article II 
By the time of the framing, state experience with legislative control of 
the appointment process had persuaded many Federalists of the wisdom of 
 
115 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII. 
116 Letter from John Jay to Robert Livingston and Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 29, 1777), in 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, pt. 2, at 683 
n.1 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) [hereinafter DHSC]. Obviously, where courts employ but a single judge, 
it may not matter a great deal whether the Constitution assigns the appointment power to the court or 
the judge. Even with single-judge courts, however, a court-based mechanism may signal that the 
appointment was to be a public act, taken in open court. As we shall see, Chief Justice Jay implemented 
such a public-regarding approach to appointments early in his tenure. See infra notes 147–59 and 
accompanying text.  
117 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116. The subsequent history of the office of clerk of the federal 
district courts certainly appears to bear out Jay’s prediction. As described in Scott Messinger’s 
intriguing history, federal court clerks came to behave just as the republican critics of fee-paid office 
would have predicted. See I. SCOTT MESSINGER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ORDER IN THE COURTS: A 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURT CLERK’S OFFICE (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/ordcourt.pdf/$file/ordcourt.pdf. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Congress took a 
series of steps to regulate the affairs of the clerk’s offices, fearing that their reliance on fees tended to 
encourage graft and corruption. See id. at 26 (quoting President Millard Fillmore’s criticism of fee-paid 
clerks as the cause of “vexation, injustice, and complaint”). One important reform was to establish a 
uniform bill of fees in 1853, but problems continued. Id. at 27. Eventually, Congress installed oversight 
through the Department of Justice, in 1870, but judges often acted to protect their clerks and their 
entitlement to fees. In 1912, an investigation by the DOJ revealed clerical misconduct in some twenty-
eight districts, leading to a series of indictments and convictions. Id. at 41. Recounting their opposition 
to reforms that would abolish the fee system and put clerks on salary, Justice Felix Frankfurter derided 
the clerks as “placemen whose clerical jobs were threatened.” Id. at 40 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 133 (1928)). 
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lodging responsibility in a single chief executive.118 Alexander Hamilton, 
James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris, in particular, shared the view that a 
multimember body was an inappropriate recipient of the appointment 
power.119 During June discussions of the selection of federal judges, Wilson 
opposed appointment by the legislature on the ground that “[i]ntrigue, 
partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences.”120 James 
Madison said much the same thing, echoing the concern with intrigue and 
adding the point that members of the legislature were not good “judges of 
the requisite qualifications.”121 Morris explained his similar view in a 
criticism of the August 1787 Committee of Detail draft, which assigned the 
appointment power to the Senate: 
He considered the body as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to cabal; 
and as devoid of responsibility.—If judges were to be tried by the Senate . . . it 
was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its 
own decrees were to create.122 
Eventually, the Convention came part way around to the views of the 
Federalists, adopting the now familiar provision for an appointment power 
initiated by the President, who nominates and, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, appoints judges and other high government 
officials.123 
Having solved the problem of appointment to high office, the 
Convention addressed the question of how to appoint inferior officers. 
Here, Morris played a leading role, proposing a provision that would 
authorize Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers “in the 
President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of Departments.”124 
 
118 For the classic account of the movement away from legislative and toward executive 
appointment, see WOOD, supra note 102, at 79, 143. 
119 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Every 
mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave in which cabal and intrigue will 
have their full scope.”); see also JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1787), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 
105 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 1954) (describing the executive as capable of cautious and “responsible” 
appointments, whereas a representative assembly is “accountable to nobody”).  
120 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records] (recording June 5, 1787 remarks of James Wilson). 
121 Id. at 120 (remarks of Madison). 
122 See 2 id. at 389 (recording Aug. 23, 1787 remarks of Gouverneur Morris). 
123 The decisive vote on the appointments power came on September 7, 1787, after the Convention 
had settled the mechanism by which the President was to be elected. See id. at 533. For a brief 
restatement of the principles underlying the Appointments Clause, see JOSEPH STORY, 
3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1524, at 376 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray 
& Co. 1833) (offices in a republican government “not as a means of corrupt influence, or individual 
profit; not for cringing favorites, or court sycophants; but for purposes of the highest public good; to 
give dignity, strength, purity, and energy to the administration of the laws”). 
124 2 Farrand’s Records, supra note 120, at 627 (recording Sept. 15, 1787 remarks of Gouverneur 
Morris). 
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Notably, the provision authorizes the assignment of appointment power to a 
multimember body, the court, rather than to the judges or chief justices of 
the courts. The provision thus differs both from the New York constitution 
(which vested power in the judges of the several courts) and from the other 
provisions in Article II that appear to call for individuals (the President or 
the department heads) to exercise the appointment power.125 As we have 
seen, Morris and his fellow Federalists generally opposed the assignment of 
appointment power to multimember bodies, worrying about corruption, 
intrigue, and concealment.126 The Convention’s choice of the courts as the 
only (obvious) multimember body to which Congress can assign the 
appointment power thus demands explanation.127 
In seeking an explanation for the choice of the courts, we might begin 
by observing the difference, in formal terms, between the work of courts 
and the work of the judges who serve on those courts. Courts conducted 
judicial business on the record, on days officially designated for the 
conduct of such business, and the public was free to attend.128 Judges, by 
contrast, were free to conduct business out of court, or in their chambers, 
and often did so in connection with chores they viewed as ministerial. The 
public, on-the-record quality of the actions of a court may have lessened 
the concern with cabal and intrigue that otherwise arose when 
 
125 Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010) 
(concluding that the multimember Securities and Exchange Commission could be considered a 
department “head” for purposes of the Appointments Clause).  
126 See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. One might contend that a thoroughgoing 
commitment to the elimination of patronage and the sale of office makes it hard to explain why Article 
II empowers Congress to assign appointment power to such individuals as the heads of department and 
the President, acting alone. A variety of explanations come to mind, including the possibility that the 
move to salarization and a public-regarding conception of office came earlier to the judiciary than to the 
Executive Branch. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
127 The Court has now concluded that another, less obvious, multimember body can exercise the 
appointment power as a department “head.” See infra note 225. One might argue that the Convention 
chose the courts as a generic placeholder in light of the fact that it was framing a constitution to govern 
a judicial system that had not yet been established. But it would have surely been just as easy to draft a 
placeholder reference to judges (“judges of the courts of law”) had that been the intention of the 
Framers. 
128 On the public quality of court days in colonial and early statehood America, see, for example, 
A.G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom: The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater Virginia, 1720 to 
1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 29 (1980). See also RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 
1740–1790, at 90 (2d ed. 1999) (“In the monthly concourse at the courthouse the male part of Virginia 
county society became visible to its members in a manner similar to that observed at the parish 
church.”). On the distinction between the work of judges in chambers or during vacation, and the work 
of courts, see Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Dec. 7, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 
116, at 682, regretting that the circuit courts cannot proceed for want of a seal, but observing that the 
statute “enables the sup. Court, and not the Judges of it to provide one,” and concluding on that basis 
that “no order on the Subject by the Judges out of Court, would be regular.” Cf. Draft Letter from the 
Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 13, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 116, at 
89–92 (1988) (criticizing the assignment of circuit-riding duties to the Justices of the Supreme Court on 
the basis of the perceived difficulty of separating courts from the judges that serve them).  
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multimember bodies made appointments. Courts of law would presumably 
owe an obligation to make their appointments part of the public record, 
thus exposing the judges to criticism if they were to make patronage-based 
appointments that favored family members or other unqualified favorites. 
The choice of the courts as the approved recipient of the appointment 
power may thus reflect an attempt to clarify that the power of appointment 
was to be a public trust, rather than a private source of personal patronage 
or judicial emolument. 
Judicial practice in the early republic frequently distinguished between 
the judge or judges of the court and the court itself. Courts, under the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, were to sit for periods of time specified in the Act, 
often less than the full year. Thus, the Supreme Court was to sit as such in 
February and August of each year, continuing until the business before the 
Court was complete.129 During the remainder of the year, the Justices 
dispersed to hold circuit courts throughout the country.130 Those courts, in 
turn, were directed to meet at specified times and places. Questions might 
arise as to what sort of relief a judge of the circuit or Supreme Court could 
provide during “vacation,” the times when the court itself was not sitting.131 
Vacation, and the distinction between court and judge, figured prominently 
in Justice John Rutledge’s reaction to a petition asking the circuit court for 
the district of North Carolina to remove an action brought by Robert Morris 
from the courts of that state by writ of certiorari. According to a 
contemporaneous letter from Morris’s attorney, Justice Rutledge thought 
the requested relief ought to be granted on the merits but doubted his power 
to act as a judge out of court.132 District judges were free to act for their 
 
129 Early terms of Court lasted but a few days; the Court had no business to conduct other than the 
ceremonial and formal business of admitting lawyers to practice before the Court. For an account, see 
1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175, reporting the Court’s first sessions as devoted to admission of 
counsel and other housekeeping work, and JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 663 (1971), observing that “it was 
not until 1796 that a substantial amount of appellate business was ready for disposition.” 
130 For an account of the burdens of circuit riding and the Justices’ efforts to secure legislative 
relief, see Pfander, supra note 14, at 31–34. 
131 The existence of vacations helps to explain why the Judiciary Act invested the judges 
themselves with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, recognizing the time-sensitive nature of 
inquiry into the legality of detention. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (providing, 
in addition to the power of federal courts to grant habeas, “that either of the justices of the supreme 
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment”); see also Pfander, supra note 25, at 1486–87 
(observing that the limited terms of the early federal courts meant that federal judges were often riding 
circuit and needed power to oversee the legality of detention as judges, rather than as courts). 
132 See Letter from Richard Nichols Harison to Robert Morris (Sept. 24, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 116, at 95, 98 (1988) (stating that Judge Rutledge “made no Objection to the Propriety of removing 
the Suit, or to granting the Injunction as far as the Merits of the Cause were concerned; but he was 
unwilling solely to take upon him, during the Vacation the Office of directing the Measures which are 
prayed by the Bill”). Similarly, when the invalid pension statute became controversial in the early 
1790s, some Justices proposed to solve the problem by acting as commissioners out of court, although 
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own account during vacation; indeed, some continued to act as lawyers in 
state court proceedings until a federal statute forbade the practice.133 
By making the court the appointing body, and countering the notion 
that judges were to exercise the power for their own account, Article II 
appears to have complemented other features of the Constitution that 
worked an important change in the nature of judicial office. Article III 
provides that the judges of both the Supreme and inferior courts are to 
receive, at stated times, a compensation for their services that shall not be 
diminished during their continuation in office.134 For a variety of reasons, 
one can probably best interpret the provision as creating a regime of 
presumptively salary-based compensation. Certainly the delegates who 
debated the compensation provision at Philadelphia appear to have 
assumed that it called for the payment of a salary and ruled out the receipt 
of fees for judicial service.135 In addition, when Congress implemented the 
Article III compensation provision, it did so by providing the judges with 
an annual salary, to be paid on a quarterly basis.136 What’s more, when 
Congress learned that a federal judge in South Carolina was collecting fees 
in admiralty cases, it promptly enacted legislation to govern such cases that 
ruled out the collection of judicial fees and thus curtailed the practice.137 
Just as the early practice under Article III appears to confirm the doubts 
some expressed about the propriety of fee-based judicial compensation, 
early steps taken by Congress and the Supreme Court to implement Article 
II similarly confirm that court-based appointments were aimed in part at 
foreclosing the favoritism, bias, and possible self-dealing inherent in the 
judicial appointment of inferior officers. To that evidence of early practice 
this Article now turns. 
D. Implementing Article II 
Early legislation erecting courts of the United States and empowering 
them to hire clerks, criers, and other personnel consistently assigned the 
appointment power to the courts, rather than to the judges staffing them. 
What’s more, Chief Justice Jay’s approach to the appointment of the first 
 
questions arose about that solution. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 35–38; see also David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 640 (1996) 
(noting that Congress fixed the invalid pension act by separating the judge from the court and assigning 
the judge certain extrajudicial duties). 
133 See Pfander, supra note 14, at 23 n.118 (describing the federal statute that forbade federal 
judges from practicing law). 
134 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
135 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
136 See Pfander, supra note 14, at 24 & nn.122–23 (discussing the Compensation and Process Acts 
of 1789); see also supra text accompanying note 20. 
137 After the Act’s passage, Thomas Bee, the district court judge for the District of South Carolina, 
acknowledged that the 1793 statute prohibited his practice of fee collection. See Pfander, supra note 14, 
at 25–26 & nn.133–34.  
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clerk of the Supreme Court, John Tucker, revealed that he took quite 
seriously the difference between court-based and Chief-based 
appointments. While the judges of many district courts were less 
punctilious than Chief Justice Jay about preserving the formal distinction 
between court-based and judge-based appointments,138 it was not until the 
Court’s 1839 decision in Ex parte Hennen that district court judicial control 
of the appointment and removal of clerks became an acknowledged part of 
the legal framework of office.139 
The story of legislative implementation begins with Section 7 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which specified the appointment of inferior judicial 
officers in the following terms: 
That the Supreme Court, and the district courts shall have power to appoint 
clerks for their respective courts . . . and that the clerk for each district court 
shall be clerk also of the circuit court in such district . . . .140 
The provision appears to have been quite consciously modeled on the 
language of Article II and seeks to vest the appointment power in the courts 
themselves rather than in the judges. Elsewhere, the legislation provided 
that the Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and five Associate 
Justices.141 Clearly, Congress opted to place the appointment power in the 
Court itself, rather than in the Chief. 
 
138 Congress provided for but a single judge to staff each of the federal district courts, thus creating 
an identity between court and judge that may have encouraged a sense of judicial entitlement. See 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (establishing in each of thirteen districts a district court 
“to consist of one judge”). Whatever the reason, some district “courts” appointed the judge’s family 
members to serve as clerks. See, e.g., MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 2 (reporting that David Sewall, 
district judge for the District of Maine, appointed his nephew Henry as clerk).  
139 See 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839) (concluding that the district court judge had discretion to 
remove the court clerk, not for cause, but to make room for the appointment of the judge’s friend). 
Shortly after Hennen came down, Congress enacted a provision empowering the circuit court to hire its 
own clerk and specifying that in cases of disagreement (between the district and circuit judge), the 
presiding judge would have the appointment. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 2, 5 Stat. 321, 322 
(“[A]ll the circuit courts of the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks . . . .”). 
140 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73, 76. When Congress first conferred power on 
the federal courts to name commissioners (an early precursor to magistrates), it vested the appointment 
power in “any circuit court or either of the district courts of Maine or Kentucky” and thus continued the 
early practice of court-based appointment. See Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 333, 334. See 
generally Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner 
System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1970) (describing the evolution from reliance on commissioners to 
reliance on magistrates). To be sure, section 2 of the nation’s first bankruptcy statute empowered 
district judges to appoint “commissioners” of the said bankrupt. See Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 
19, 21–22. But it appears from the oath requirement in section 3 that such commissioners were to act 
for the bankrupt during the pendency of the proceeding and not as inferior officers of the United States. 
Id. § 3. The Act was repealed in 1803. See Act of December 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. 
141 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. at 73 (declaring that the Supreme Court shall 
consist of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, and specifying that the Court’s sessions would 
begin on the first Monday of February and August at the seat of government). 
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Some might argue that the provision for appointing marshals 
complicates the story of early implementation. Section 27 provides that a 
“marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four 
years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be 
to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the 
Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit.”142 The provision 
fails to identify an appointing and removing superior and certainly does not 
specify a court-based appointment mechanism. But neither does it 
contemplate appointment by the district court judge. The phrasing of the 
provision makes clear that marshals, although judicial servants in the sense 
that they were duty-bound to execute the “lawful precepts” of the courts 
they attended and perform other chores, were to be appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. And so they were.143 
As a consequence, the marshals’ office has long been viewed as a part of 
the Executive Branch of government and now operates within the 
Department of Justice.144 Far from disproving a consistent practice of 
assigning judicial appointments to the court, rather than the judge, the 
marshal provision actually confirms the drafters’ careful attention to 
matters of form and structure.145 In any case, later legislation carried on the 
pattern of vesting the power to appoint judicial officers in the courts.146 
Chief Justice John Jay played a central role in implementing the 
practice of court-based, rather than Chief-based, appointment of inferior 
officers. In late 1789, shortly after it became generally known that he was 
to become the Chief Justice, Jay was inundated with requests for patronage 
appointments that proceeded on the assumption that he would make the 
 
142 Id. § 27, 1 Stat. at 87. Deputy marshals were to be appointed by the marshal, subject to removal 
from office “by the judge of the district court.” Id. Interestingly, then, the statute gives the President 
removal power over the marshals and the district judge removal power over deputy marshals. Perhaps 
the drafters sought to give the judge some leverage over deputies in case the marshal were to leave the 
office in charge of a deputy that the judge deemed unfit to perform its duties. The choice of the judge as 
the party with the removal power, rather than the court, suggests that the drafters did not view Article 
II’s court-based appointment provision as a limit on the assignment of removal power. 
143 The marshal was expected to serve as the federal analog to the state sheriff, serving writs and 
precepts, handling court funds and federal prisoners, and overseeing the federal census operation in the 
district. For an account of the early history of the marshal’s office, featuring a discussion of President 
Washington’s appointments, see FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES MARSHALS 
AND THEIR DEPUTIES, 1789–1989 (1989), and David S. Turk, A Brief Primer on the History of the U.S. 
Marshals Service, FED. LAW., Aug. 2008, at 26. 
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (2006) (“There is hereby established a United States Marshals Service as 
a bureau within the Department of Justice . . . .”). 
145 The decision to assign the power to appoint (and remove) marshals to the President may have 
reflected the conclusion that the execution of judgments was a matter for the Executive Branch of 
government. 
146 See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 7, 1 Stat. 624, 626 (declaring the “respective courts of the 
United States shall appoint criers for their courts, to be allowed the sum of two dollars per day”); see 
also supra note 139 (quoting the provision in the Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, 5 Stat. 321, for the 
circuit courts to appoint the court’s clerk). 
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appointments himself (in keeping with the English model). For example, in 
one such letter, Theodore Sedgwick (a member of the Massachusetts 
congressional delegation) apologized for soliciting Chief Justice Jay on 
behalf of a friend. But, Sedgwick explained, such applications must 
frequently come “to men [like Chief Justice Jay] who have the power to 
confer offices.”147 Fisher Ames made the same assumption, writing in 
November 1789 to recommend an “eminently qualified” candidate “to your 
favour and patronage.”148 Even fellow Justice William Cushing wrote Chief 
Justice Jay to press the case of an applicant for the clerk position.149 
Chief Justice Jay’s response to these supplications was remarkable; he 
consistently rejected the notion that he had the power to make the 
appointment himself and insisted that the decision would be taken by the 
Court following consultation with the Justices in attendance. Consider his 
reply to Fisher Ames: 
There are at present several candidates for the place in question, and probably 
the number will be increased before the appointment takes place. As it should 
be the result of mutual information and joint consultation between the judges, 
it appears to me proper that I should in the mean time remain free from 
engagements, express or implied, to or for any gentleman, however well 
recommended.150 
Chief Justice Jay said much the same thing in his reply to Justice Cushing: 
I have made it a Rule to keep myself free from Engagements, and at Liberty to 
vote as after mutual Consultation among the Judges shall appear most 
adviseable. . . . There are several matters which will demand early attention; 
and it would doubtless be useful to have some informal meetings before 
Court, in order to consider and mature such measures as will then become 
indispensable.151 
Chief Justice Jay’s sharpest remarks were directed to an acquaintance, John 
DuMott, who had approached him for an office. Chief Justice Jay turned 
down the request, explaining: 
[O]n these occasions it is best to be very explicit. [I]t would neither be 
friendly nor candid to excite delusory Expectations, or to make Promises 
without a good Prospect of performing them. There is not a single office in my 
Gift, nor do I recollect that there is more than one in the appointment of the 
 
147 See Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to John Jay (Sept. 23, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 
116, at 665. 
148 See Letter from Fisher Ames to John Jay (Nov. 10, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 
676. 
149 See Letter from William Cushing to John Jay (Nov. 18, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 
116, at 678–79. Justice Cushing, Ames, and Sedgwick all supported the eventual appointee, John 
Tucker. 
150 Letter from John Jay to Fisher Ames (Nov. 27, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 680.  
151 Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Dec. 7, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 
682. 
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Court . . . . [A]s to offices in the Gift of other Departments I think it my Duty 
not to interfere . . . .152 
In each instance, then, Chief Justice Jay rejected the assumption that offices 
in the Judicial Branch were his to confer and apparently did so because the 
Court was the appointing agency and was to decide the matter after “joint 
consultation between the judges.”153 
Looking to the official record of the actions taken by the Supreme 
Court when it convened at the nation’s capital (New York City) in 
February 1790, we find Chief Justice Jay was as good as his word. 
Although there was little judicial business to do,154 the Court did manage to 
appoint two inferior officers (a crier and a clerk) and began to admit 
attorneys and counselors to practice before the bar of the Court. The 
official minutes of the Court’s first two sessions include the following 
entries: 
 Ordered, that Richard Wenman, be, and he is appointed Cryer of this 
Court.155 
 Ordered, that John Tucker Esq. of Boston, be the Clerk of this Court. That 
he reside, and keep his Office at the Seat of the National Government, and that 
he do not practice either as an Attorney or a Counsellor in this Court while he 
shall continue to be Clerk of the same.156 
Although a matter of routine, these two appointments provide important 
insights into the Court’s own understanding of its appointment power. 
First, although the Justices had met in advance about the clerkship 
appointment and settled on Tucker, they nonetheless viewed themselves as 
duty bound to formalize the appointment by issuing an order in open court 
 
152 See Letter from John Jay to John DuMont (Feb. 27, 1790), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 
696–97. Chief Justice Jay was slightly more forthcoming in a response to a request for office submitted 
by his sister-in-law on behalf of her husband. See Letter from John Jay to Catharine Ridley (Nov. 11, 
1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 677 (describing the position of clerk as unlikely to afford 
Mr. Ridley “a [l]iving”). 
153 Such a collegial approach to selection of officers would have the incidental effect of protecting 
individual judges both from the burden of dealing with office seekers and from the obligation to explain 
why favored candidates were rejected. 
154 Although the Court failed to muster a quorum on the first Monday of the month, a fourth Justice 
arrived and the Chief Justice proclaimed the Court open for business. Newspaper reports suggest that 
the event was well attended by the leading statesmen of the day, many of whom were already in town as 
members of Congress. 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 171 & n.2 (reproducing the official minutes of 
the Court, which describe the absence of a quorum on February 1, 1790, and the need for deferral of 
business to the next day); see also id. at 165 n.4 (describing the temporary appointment of McKesson as 
clerk before Tucker was chosen to serve); id. pt. 2, at 686–87 (collecting newspaper coverage of the 
Court’s initial failure to muster a quorum). The Court would not docket its first case for several sessions 
and would not issue its first written opinion until 1792. See GOEBEL, supra note 129, at 554, 662–65. 
155 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175. 
156 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 3, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175. 
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that would become a part of the official record.157 It was not enough simply 
to send Tucker a letter of engagement or enter into a handshake agreement. 
If the Court was to be the appointing agent, then the Court was obliged to 
take action in accordance with the forms of law. The Justices’ decision to 
make an official appointment by court order helps to explain why they took 
no action the first day, when the absence of a quorum prevented the Court 
as such from conducting official business.158 It also explains why the 
Justices arranged to have a temporary clerk record the minutes of the 
actions taken before the appointment of Tucker was formalized.159 By 
preserving minutes, the Court would ensure that Tucker’s position would 
be both formally lawful and part of the public record. 
The Court’s appointment of the crier may be even more revealing. At 
the time the Court acted, there was no statutory warrant for such an office. 
It had not been created in the Judiciary Act, and the Process and 
Compensation Acts similarly omitted any mention of the office.160 Indeed, 
it was not until 1799 that Congress first authorized such a position, 
declaring that each court of the United States shall appoint a crier and pay 
two dollars a day for his services.161 That the 1790 appointment anticipated 
the statute by nine years suggests that the Justices took the view that the 
Court enjoyed inherent power to hire personnel viewed as necessary to the 
conduct of judicial business.162 Apart from power to hire needed 
employees, the appointment of the crier may shed additional light on the 
Court’s understanding of the requirements of Article II. In appointing 
Tucker as clerk, after all, one might understand the Court to have been 
following the lead of the Judiciary Act, which defined the court as the 
appointing agency. In the absence of a statutory directive, the Court’s 
formal action in appointing the crier may more clearly reflect the Justices’ 
own view of the constitutional locus of the appointment power. 
 
157 See Letter from John Jay to William Cushing, supra note 151. 
158 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 171. 
159 On the appointment of a temporary clerk, see 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175 n.9, noting 
that John McKesson acted as clerk on the first day the Court convened. 
160 See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (declaring that in suits at common law, the 
circuit and district courts were to follow the writs, modes of execution, and rates of fees of the state 
courts in which they sat); cf. Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 72 (setting the salary of all federal 
judges and the Attorney General of the United States but failing to address the payment to such judicial 
officials as the clerk or the crier). 
161 See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 7, 1 Stat. 624, 626. 
162 For a careful assessment of inherent judicial authority, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent 
Powers of the Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001). Pushaw 
does not address the inherent power of courts to hire personnel viewed as necessary to conduct judicial 
business, although he does acknowledge as a general matter that courts can take action without 
legislative authority that they find essential to carry out their judicial duties. See id. at 847–48; see also 
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1677, 1681 (2004) (distinguishing between weak inherent power to act without congressional authority 
and strong inherent power to act counter to congressional dictates). 
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Whatever the crier’s significance for the debate over inherent powers, 
the two appointments reveal a consistent commitment to a court-based 
appointment process.163 The Court followed the practice of court-based 
appointments for several years. Tucker resigned the clerk’s post after two 
years, forcing the Court to find a replacement. The result of the search 
appears in an order published on August 1, 1791: 
 Ordered, that Samuel Bayard be the Clerk of this Court in the place of John 
Tucker Esquire of Boston resigned . . . .164 
Bayard served for nine years, in part by appointing deputy clerks to 
perform the office in his absence, and then resigned in 1800.165 Even 
though Jay had long since left the bench and the Chief Justiceship, the 
Court appointed Bayard’s successor by entering an order to that effect in 
open court.166 Even today, the power to appoint the Court’s clerk, librarian, 
reporter, and marshal remains in the Court, rather than the Chief Justice.167 
Efforts to switch to a Chief-based approach have not taken hold, at 
least with the Court’s own clerk and marshal. Following his installation as 
Chief Justice in December 1864, Salmon Chase developed draft language 
 
163 Chief Justice Jay’s correspondence reveals that he viewed the appointments as matters for the 
court to settle through consultation and deliberation among the Justices. We cannot reconstruct the 
nature of the deliberative process, but we do know that other candidates had been put forward, that 
Tucker had strong support from Justice Cushing and from other leading figures in Massachusetts 
politics, and that Tucker had served effectively as the clerk of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court. We also know that Chief Justice Jay had advised Justice Cushing that candidates for the office 
should plan to attend the Court’s first session in New York. Letter from John Jay to William Cushing 
(Dec. 7, 1789), supra note 151. Tucker, accordingly, was present in the courtroom. Chief Justice Jay’s 
correspondence does not reveal anything about the Court’s internal deliberations. But however 
deferential he was to his colleagues in the selection of the clerk and crier, he was obviously quite 
influential in shaping the way the Court approached the appointment process. Rather than a judge-based 
appointment process, Chief Justice Jay ensured that the Court itself played the official role as the 
appointing agency. 
164 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 1, 1791, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 192 
(footnote omitted). 
165 For an account of Bayard’s service as clerk and his reliance on deputy clerks, see 1 DHSC, pt. 
1, supra note 116, at 162–63. 
166 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 15, 1800, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 330–31 
(“Samuel Bayard Esquire having resigned the Office of Clerk of this Court. It is Ordered that Elias B. 
Caldwell be appointed to the said Place . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Chief Justice Jay resigned in 1795 to 
become governor of New York. In 1800, Oliver Ellsworth was presiding as Chief Justice; as a senator 
from Connecticut, Ellsworth had played a lead role in drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789.  
167 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671–674 (2006) (declaring that the Supreme Court may appoint officers to 
serve as clerk, marshal, reporter, and librarian, and setting out the duties of such officials). Congress 
first conferred power on the Court to appoint a reporter in 1817, vesting the appointment power in the 
“Supreme Court.” See Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 376. Power to appoint a marshal was first 
conferred on the Court in 1866. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, pt. 1, at 167 (1971) (describing the 
adoption of the marshal provision). 
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for inclusion in a bill to reorganize the federal judiciary.168 Among his 
suggestions was one that provided: The “Chief Justice with the approval of 
the Court may appoint a Marshal . . . .”169 When the issue came before the 
Senate, the proponent of the language urged it as something the “judges” 
had suggested.170 Senator Reverdy Johnson countered that he had never 
heard from the “judges” any complaint about the existing practice of court-
based appointment.171 Others objected as well, and the provision was 
rejected. In the leading historical account of the episode, Charles Fairman 
recounts the court-based system that Chief Justice Chase had inherited and 
explains he proposed a switch to a Chief-based system because he “had his 
own man in mind” for a bit of “patronage.”172 The Senate’s rejection of a 
switch thus represents a modest vindication of the constitutional principle 
that the appointments were to be the product of a consultative process with 
all of the Justices in an effort to end the patronage-based appointment 
practices of the past. 
E. The Drift to a Chief-Based Appointment Process 
However consistent the early Court’s practice in making court-based 
appointments of inferior judicial officers, such a practice did not 
necessarily prevent district court judges from treating clerkship 
appointments as a source of patronage. In an engaging history of the office 
of the district court clerk, Scott Messinger reveals that the first clerk 
appointed in the District of Maine was the nephew of the presiding judge.173 
Messinger also tells the story of Ex parte Hennen, litigation that grew out 
 
168 Chase was confirmed as Chief Justice and took his seat in December 1864 as the Civil War was 
winding down, filling the post vacated by Chief Justice Roger Taney’s death. With him on the bench 
were a number of Justices appointed by Lincoln’s predecessors (Justice Wayne, from Georgia; Justice 
Catron, from Tennessee; Justice Nelson, from New York; Justice Grier, from Pennsylvania; and Justice 
Clifford, from Maine). In addition, Chief Justice Chase had four Republican colleagues who had, like 
him, been named to the bench by Lincoln (Justice Swayne, Ohio; Justice Miller, Iowa; Justice Davis, 
Illinois; and Justice Field, California). For an account, see FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 1–4. 
169 See id. at 167 (quoting language of section 2 of the Chief Justice Chase draft). 
170 Id. at 168–69. 
171 Id. at 169. 
172 Id. at 167, 171; see also JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 410 (1995) 
(confirming that Chief Justice Chase wanted to secure the position for his close friend and associate 
Richard Parsons). 
173 See MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 15 (noting that Henry Sewall, nephew of district court judge 
David Sewall, was appointed as the first clerk of the District of Maine and describing other patronage-
based appointments in the nineteenth century culminating in an Act of Congress that forbade nepotism). 
Messinger reports that the early clerks were paid out of the fees they collected from litigants, thereby 
producing some of the same problems with fee-paid office and corruption that the Framers had 
elsewhere attempted to avoid. See id. at 8–12, 20 (describing the fee system and the discovery in 1818 
that the district clerk in New York had embezzled over $100,000, apparently with the connivance of the 
appointing judge). Eventually, in 1919, Congress placed the clerks on salary. Id. at 44–45. For a survey 
of early compensation practices, see THOMAS K. URDAHL, THE FEE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
122–33 (Madison, Wis., Democrat Printing Co. 1898).  
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of the decision of a newly appointed district judge in Louisiana to replace 
the incumbent clerk with a friend.174 In making the appointment, the district 
judge admitted that he was acting, not out of concern with Hennen’s 
abilities, but out of “feelings of kindness” for Winthrop, the new 
appointee.175 Although the former clerk sought a mandamus to compel his 
continuation in office, at least as a circuit court clerk, the Court refused to 
issue the writ. The Court confirmed that the clerk was one of the inferior 
officers contemplated by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 
properly subject to appointment by the courts of law.176 But in the absence 
of any statutory guidance, the Court simply presumed that clerks were 
removable at the will of the district court and could claim no vested right in 
the office.177 
The judicial practice approved in Hennen, which reflects a close 
identification of the district judge with the district court over which he 
presided, may help to explain how judges rather than courts came to be 
seen as the appointing authority for inferior judicial officers. Another factor 
in the evolution away from a court-based appointment process may have 
been the need to empower an official to act with reasonable dispatch in 
performing certain administrative chores when the courts were unable to 
convene as such. In 1850, Congress adopted legislation to staff the district 
courts when, by virtue of illness or disability, the incumbent district judge 
was unable to do so. The mode chosen was to allow either the circuit judge 
for the relevant circuit or the Chief Justice to “designate and appoint” a 
district judge from an adjoining district to serve in the disabled judge’s 
place.178 A short time later, Congress broadened the authority of the circuit 
 
174 See 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). At the time, the Judiciary Act provided that the clerk of the 
district court was to be selected by that court and was also to serve as the clerk of the circuit court. See 
supra text accompanying note 140. The circuit judge preferred Hennen, the old clerk, and had blocked 
the new clerk, Winthrop, from taking up circuit clerk duties. The Court’s rejection of the mandamus 
petition left the district court in charge of choosing and removing the clerk for both courts. Congress 
addressed the potential conflict by statute a short time later, vesting power in the circuit court to appoint 
its own clerk. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 2, 5 Stat. 321, 322 (declaring that all “circuit courts of 
the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks” and further providing in case of a 
division among the judges that the presiding judge shall make the selection). 
175 MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 17 (describing Judge Lawrence’s decision to replace Hennen 
with Winthrop). 
176 See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 258. 
177 See id. at 259. 
178 See Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442 (amended 1852) (authorizing circuit judge or Chief 
Justice to “designate and appoint” a district judge from the same or an adjoining circuit to serve in the 
place of the disabled judge). An earlier statute had conferred a similar form of designation authority on 
circuit “court[s].” See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 25, 2 Stat. 89, 97 (repealed 1802) (authorizing 
circuit court, in case of district judge’s disability, to assign a circuit judge to perform the duties of the 
district judge during the continuance of the disability). In a still later attempt to address the disabilities 
of district judges, Congress authorized the circuit court or its circuit justice to issue a writ of certiorari, 
removing actions from the docket of the district court to that of the circuit court for resolution there. See 
Act of March 2, 1809, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 534. Notably, to the extent the 1801 legislation called for an 
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judge and Chief Justice to allow them to designate adjoining district judges 
to address the “accumulation or urgency of judicial business in any 
district.”179 At the time of the enactment, the Court’s term ran from the first 
Monday in December 1851 to May 27, 1852.180 That left a substantial 
period of time when the Justices of the Supreme Court were riding circuit 
and unable to convene as a Court to make an official designation.181 
Another decisive step was taken towards a Chief-based process during 
Reconstruction as part of the Republicans’ desire to ensure the patronage-
based appointments of Republican office seekers. Thus, in the midst of 
Reconstruction debates in early 1867, Congress found time to adopt a new 
bankruptcy law that included a provision that called for the Chief to play a 
special role in the appointment of the bankruptcy registers to assist the 
district courts. The provision reads as follows: 
That it shall be the duty of the judges of the district courts . . . to appoint in 
each Congressional district . . . , upon the nomination and recommendation of 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, one or more 
registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the district court . . . .182 
According to a leading account, Congress consulted with Chief Justice 
Chase before adopting the provision and he failed to object, perhaps due in 
part to his interest in controlling the patronage and in part to his desire to 
maintain good relations with the Republican members of Congress.183 But 
Chief Justice Chase was flooded with petitions and delayed taking action in 
his new executive capacity while he sought out the views of his brethren on 
the constitutionality of his new role.184 Eventually, he agreed to perform the 
function, adopting something of a straddle: he would act, not as the 
appointing official, but would make nominations to the district judge on 
 
appointment, it placed the power in the circuit court. The 1809 legislation did not make an appointment, 
but simply treated disability as the trigger for removal. 
179 See Act of April 2, 1852, ch. 20, 10 Stat. 5. 
180 See CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 284 (1974) (as there were no statutory designations for term length or date, 
the Court took it upon itself to lengthen its term in an effort to cope with its growing docket). 
181 Prior to the 1850 and 1852 enactments, an 1848 legislative proposal to relieve the Justices of all 
circuit responsibilities for a one-year period was rejected by the Senate. The Acts of 1850, 9 Stat. 442, 
and 1852, 10 Stat. 5, served as a “[p]iecemeal attempt[]” to maintain the circuit riding system while 
mollifying the overworked Justices, see SWISHER, supra note 180, at 282–84 & n.27. 
182 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, 518, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 
160, 20 Stat. 99. 
183 See FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 355–65 (recounting the episode and the consultation with 
Chief Justice Chase and criticizing him for having failed to resist the imposition of the appointive role). 
184 In a letter to his Republican colleague, Justice Miller, Chief Justice Chase expressed a 
willingness to perform the duty, onerous as it was, so long as it was “not unconstitutional.” Id. at 357. 
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which that judge was expected to exercise an uncertain degree of 
independent judgment.185 
Apparently, it was this straddle that persuaded both Chief Justice 
Chase and Congress that the Chief’s role was consistent with the 
constitutional requirement of a Court-based appointment. Indeed, Senator 
Roscoe Conkling defended the provision as one that the House “very 
carefully” considered and had upheld on the ground that it entailed only 
nomination by the Chief rather than appointment.186 It was true, as a formal 
matter, that the appointment was to be made by the district judge. But 
members of the Senate still raised questions. Senator Reverdy Johnson 
expressed the following constitutional doubts: 
 The Constitution provides . . . that Congress may . . . vest the appointment 
[of inferior officers] in a head of a Department or in a court. There is no 
authority to vest it in any individual member of a court; but this clause, so far 
from vesting the appointment in the [district] courts . . . , gives them merely a 
negative upon the nomination of the Chief Justice.187 
Others expressed practical concerns; how was the Chief to learn the 
qualifications and reputation of local office seekers?188 Thus, when Chief 
Justice Chase initially declined to make any nominations, members of the 
Senate unsuccessfully moved to repeal the provision in part on 
constitutional grounds. 
Whatever one’s view of the formal distinction between Chief Justice 
Chase as a nominating official and the district court as the appointing 
entity, it appears quite evident that Republicans designed the provision to 
ensure patronage-based appointments. Chase was a newly appointed 
Republican Justice, and known to harbor presidential aspirations.189 Both of 
the alternatives—the Court, with several holdover Justices from previous 
 
185 Thus, in correspondence with the district judges, Chief Justice Chase described the action of the 
district judge as “wholly independent of mine.” Id. at 365 n.211. He also dissented from the doctrine 
that the district judges are “at all bound by the nomination of the Chief Justice.” Id. But he also advised 
one recalcitrant district judge to reconsider his decision to reject two of his nominees. Id.  
186 Id. at 359. 
187 Id. at 358 (alterations in original) (quoting Sen. Reverdy Johnson). A Democrat from Maryland, 
Senator Johnson was among Congress’s most knowledgeable students of the Constitution. See HAROLD 
M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
1835–1875, at 313 (1982). His dim view of Reconstruction was informed both by his national political 
ambitions and his perception that it threatened to “subject the white man to the absolute and 
unconditional dominion of an armed force of a colored race.” ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 
1866–1876, at 52 (Fordham Univ. Press 2005) (1985). 
188 FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 356 (quoting Sen. Thomas Hendricks of Indiana). 
189 Eventually, Chase did stand for the presidency, allowing his daughter Kate to manage his 
unsuccessful candidacy for the presidential nomination of the Democratic (!) party. See NIVEN, supra 
note 172, at 428–32. 
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administrations,190 and the district courts—were conceivably less well 
disposed to Republican office seekers.191 Assignment of a controlling role 
in the process to the Chief could help to ensure the appointment of loyal 
Republican bankruptcy registers in a way that a more decentralized or 
court-based process might not. A major supporter of the legislation, Roscoe 
Conkling, thus imagined that the Chief-based system would ensure a role 
for the party; the Chief would not necessarily choose registers himself but 
could simply rely on the House and Senate delegations from the relevant 
district to identify the designee, thus transferring the value of the 
appointment to the local party apparatus.192 
Although the Chief’s nominating power did not survive the repeal of 
the bankruptcy law,193 the Chief’s designation power took hold. Thus, the 
early designation statutes from the 1850s provided a precedent on which 
Congress could rely in creating the Commerce Court in 1910.194 With 
President Taft in the White House, pressing for the bill, Congress adopted 
legislation that created a special court to test the legality and enforce the 
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The law provided for the 
appointment of five Article III judges to staggered five-year terms. Upon 
the conclusion of their Commerce terms, the judges were to serve on 
regional circuit courts to which they were also appointed.195 The 
controversy arose from a provision that called upon the Chief to appoint 
successor judges from other Article III courts to serve when the initial five-
year terms ended.196 Members of Congress criticized this vesting of 
 
190 See supra note 168 (describing the ten-Justice Court of the day as including five Justices 
appointed by previous administrations and five appointed by Lincoln). 
191 See FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 355–56 (quoting Sen. Fessenden for the proposition that 
members of Congress supported the assignment of the appointment power to whatever judge or court 
best aligned with “their way of thinking”). But as Fairman cogently observes, it makes little difference 
which court actually makes the formal appointment if the Chief has control of the nomination process. 
Id. at 356. 
192 One defender of the legislation matter-of-factly assumed that the Chief would simply follow the 
recommendations of the congressional delegation in making his nominations. See id. at 360 (quoting the 
comment of Sen. Conkling). 
193 The Act of 1867 was repealed in 1878; the next bankruptcy act, adopted in 1898, did not 
contain the same appointment mechanism but instead assigned the power to appoint referees in 
bankruptcy to the district courts they served. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 544, 555. 
For an account, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 25 (1995). 
194 See Mann–Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. For an account of the Commerce Court, 
describing its three-year history and its disbandment by a disgruntled Congress, see George E. Dix, The 
Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964), 
and Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review 
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 965–67 (2011). 
195 See 36 Stat. at 540. 
196 See id. 
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appointment authority in a single person and argued that the Court should 
make the appointment instead.197 
While Congress later disbanded the Commerce Court, the role of the 
Chief in designating current Article III judges to serve on specialty courts 
has remained very much alive. As Professor Ruger tells the story, Congress 
has created a series of special tribunals and directed the Chief to staff them 
with judges drawn from the ranks of current federal judges. These tribunals 
include the Emergency Court of Appeals (1942–1961), which heard 
appeals from the federal agency charged with setting prices during World 
War II; the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (1968–present), which 
entertains motions to transfer related cases for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings before a single district court; the Special Division of the D.C. 
Circuit (1978–2000), which appointed independent counsels and defined 
the scope of their investigative authority under the terms of the Ethics in 
Government Act; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and 
Court of Review (1978–present), which reviews Justice Department 
applications for national security investigative warrants.198 As Professor 
Ruger aptly notes, Congress has apparently come to regard Taft’s once-
controversial model of Chief designation as “relatively unexceptional.”199 
In the next Part, this Article will evaluate the constitutionality of Chief-
based appointments. 
III. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHIEF-BASED APPOINTMENTS 
As we have seen, scholars who have examined the question believe 
that the Chief’s appointment powers pass constitutional muster. For these 
scholars, two factors—the long history of Chief-centered appointments and 
the perception that the Chief acts for the Court in making appointments—
cast doubt on the claim that Article II requires the Court to act.200 In this 
Part, I first set out the elements of the affirmative case for a Court-based 
appointment requirement. The second section of this Part explores various 
elements of the defense of the Chief’s role. The third section offers a few 
preliminary thoughts about how the Congress and the Supreme Court could 
collaborate on a court-based appointment system with relatively modest 
dislocation to current practice. 
This Article does not advance any particular claim about the theory of 
constitutional interpretation. Rather, drawing on the interpretive modalities 
of Professor Bobbitt,201 the Article relies on evidence from the text, 
 
197 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 361 (quoting Sens. Robert LaFollette and 
Thomas Gore). 
198 Id. at 362–67. 
199 Id. at 367. 
200 See id. at 374 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991)).  
201 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–119 (1982) 
(elaborating six modalities of constitutional argument, including arguments from text, structure, history, 
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structure, and history of Article II, all of which point in much the same 
direction. Indeed, the historical evidence tends to confirm that the Framers 
of Article II were right to fear patronage in creating a court-based 
appointment process. Rather than selling offices for their personal account, 
the judges who have accepted a role in the appointment process have 
chosen patronage of a different stripe. Just as the district judge in Louisiana 
replaced his court’s clerk, Mr. Hennen, with a personal friend, so too did 
Chief Justice Chase accept a congressionally conferred role in the 
appointment process in part to help advance a partisan agenda. Critics of 
the Chief’s role in subsequent years have worried, with varying degrees of 
candor, that political considerations might inform the Chief’s selections. 
The clarity of the text, coupled with the continuing relevance of the 
discipline such a process would impose, provide the basis for a strong 
argument in favor of a return to a court-based approach to the appointment 
of inferior judicial officers. 
A. Advancing a Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis 
The formal case in favor of restricting the power of Congress to invest 
the Chief with power to appoint inferior officers in the Judicial Branch 
flows directly from the language of Article II. It provides that Congress can 
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President, in the heads of 
departments, or in the courts of law. Because the Chief Justice is none of 
these, one might argue that Congress cannot constitutionally vest the Chief 
with appointment powers. Such an account gains strength from the 
considerations that emerged in Part II. As the history explored there 
reveals, the Framers had reason to distinguish the Court from the Chief in 
thinking about how to structure a public-regarding appointment process. 
Moreover, the early practice of Congress and the Supreme Court appears to 
have respected the Court’s appointing role. The case for a Court-centered 
appointment practice thus finds support in the text, in the early institutional 
practice, and in a functional account of the appointment process as a public 
trust. 
The legislative precedents that led away from a Court-centered 
appointment process help to underscore the wisdom of placing the power in 
the courts of law, rather than the judges that staff them. To be sure, the 
motives that underlay the provision for Chief-based nomination of 
bankruptcy registers differed in important respects from the patronage 
concerns that animated the Framers of Article II. In the eighteenth century, 
 
precedent, prudence, and ethos); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29–89 (2000) (setting out the elements of a “documentarian” approach to 
constitutional interpretation that nonetheless leaves considerable room for arguments based on history, 
structure, and precedent); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750 n.9 (1999) 
(developing a distinctive brand of text-centered interpretation but nonetheless celebrating Bobbitt’s 
interpretive modalities as a “brilliant” contribution to the field). 
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the Framers focused on the power of chief judges to line their own pockets 
through the sale of offices to underlings. Such sales tended to result in the 
multiplication of offices and an increase in the fees associated with 
litigation. By the nineteenth century, patronage under the spoils system 
provided the political parties with a way to reward loyal supporters with the 
financial security of an office. Less well known, patronage also provided 
the party with a source of funds to spend in the electoral process. Party 
loyalists who landed jobs through the spoils system were expected to work 
for the party and to pay over a portion of their salary to help underwrite the 
party machine.202 The choice of Chief Justice Chase to nominate 
bankruptcy referees thus helped to ensure a new set of officers from which 
the Republicans could demand political support and payola. While Chief 
Justice Chase was not selling the office of bankruptcy register for his own 
account, his role surely enabled the Republican Party to extend its control 
over the offices for patronage purposes. A court-based appointment 
process, either lodged in the Supreme Court or in the district courts, would 
have been far less subject to single-party capture. 
Court-centered appointments also make sense in light of the 
hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary and the vesting of the judicial 
power in courts rather than judges. Unlike Article II, which vests executive 
power in an individual (the President), Article III vests the judicial power 
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may ordain 
and establish.203 (No power is vested in the Chief Justice, other than that to 
preside in the Senate over impeachment trials of the President.) Apart from 
the vesting of power in the Court, Article III imposes requirements of 
unity, supremacy, and inferiority that place the Supreme Court alone atop a 
judicial pyramid, with a wide variety of inferior courts and tribunals at the 
base.204 Recent scholarship suggests that such inferior courts and tribunals 
owe a duty of obedience to the Court’s precedents and must remain subject 
to the Court’s oversight and control.205 Although it operates as a 
 
202 See generally RONALD J. HREBENAR ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND 
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (1999) (highlighting the importance of patronage in maintaining loyal party 
workers and in filling party coffers); A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1992) (same). For an intriguing suggestion that patronage was 
relatively benign, reflecting a modest level of corruption, and played a crucial role in building the 
nascent American party system, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING 
SOCIETIES 66–69 (1968), arguing that patronage played a valuable role in stabilizing American 
democracy. 
203 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
204 See generally PFANDER, supra note 22 (Supreme Court must retain the power to oversee and 
control all inferior courts and tribunals).  
205 It was precisely this pyramidal conception of the Article III judiciary that the Scottish-born 
jurist James Wilson put forward in his 1791 lectures on the structure of the federal judiciary. Recent 
scholarship, moreover, reveals that the Scottish judicial system on which Wilson may have relied in 
drafting Article III featured the elements of supremacy and inferiority that were included in the 
Constitution. Thus, the Scottish Court of Session was proclaimed the supreme court and all other 
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multimember body, the Supreme Court resembles the President in being 
constitutionally installed as the head of one branch of the federal 
government. 
The provision for appointment of inferior officers by the courts of law 
complements this hierarchical structure by authorizing Congress to vest the 
appointment power in the courts, both Supreme and inferior, in which 
Article III vests the judicial power. Such a provision maintains the Article 
III hierarchy; the Supreme Court can make appointments of inferior 
officers and the lower courts can make similar appointments. The Court’s 
decision in Ex parte Hennen suggests that, at least in the absence of a 
contrary statutory prescription, such officers will be subject to removal at 
the appointing court’s will, thereby ensuring that they remain responsive to 
their appointing tribunal. While the Supreme Court cannot necessarily 
discharge officers appointed by the lower courts, it can oversee the work of 
those courts to ensure that they properly play their judicial role. The choice 
of the courts as the recipient of the appointment power thus ensures that the 
Court, declared supreme in Article III, will retain its role at the top of the 
judicial hierarchy and will be in a position to oversee the work of any 
inferior officers it appoints. 
One can imagine at least three ways to defend the Chief as the 
depository of the appointment power. First, one might argue that Freytag 
treats the Chief and the Court as equivalent for purposes of the appointment 
power. Second, one might view the judicial bureaucracy as a separate 
department, with the Chief Justice serving as its head. Third, one might 
question whether at least some of the Chief’s appointees should be 
regarded as inferior officers within the meaning of Article II. The next 
section explores these issues. 
B. Testing the Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis 
Scholars defend the appointment role of the Chief Justice as one that 
enjoys the support of a lengthy pedigree, dating at least from the 
Progressive Era. But scholars advancing such an argument have thus far 
failed to take account of early practice. We have seen that the Framers of 
the Constitution likely provided for assignment of appointment powers to 
the Court, rather than the Chief, to ensure a more transparent, publicly 
accountable appointment process and to clarify that offices within the 
judicial bureaucracy were not for sale.206 Chief Justice Jay took pains to 
honor the spirit of Article II by ensuring that the appointments of inferior 
officers were made in open court.207 Today, by contrast, the power to 
 
tribunals were required to remain subordinate to the Session and to comply with its decisions. See 
Pfander & Birk, supra note 22, at 1674–77. Wilson served on the Committee of Detail and played a 
central role in the drafting of Article III. See id. at 1673. 
206 See supra Part II.C–D. 
207 See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text. 
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appoint such officers as the director of the Administrative Office has been 
statutorily assigned to the Chief Justice alone.208 The Court has no role to 
play, either in the appointment or removal decision. As a practical matter, 
then, it seems quite difficult to characterize the appointment practice as one 
in which the Chief acts for the Court in making appointments. 
Nor does Freytag v. Commissioner support an argument that the Chief 
Justice should be deemed to act for the Supreme Court in making 
appointments.209 To be sure, the statute in Freytag authorized the chief 
judge of the Tax Court to appoint special judges, and the Supreme Court 
upheld the statute after concluding that the Tax Court qualified as a court of 
law within the meaning of Article II. The conclusion has helped to 
persuade scholars to equate the appointment power of a court with that of 
its chief judge. But during oral argument in Freytag, the Court was told that 
the chief judge of the Tax Court was selected for the position by the other 
judges of the Tax Court acting in their collective capacity.210 As a result, the 
Court decided Freytag on the assumption that the chief judge had been 
chosen by the court itself. While one can plausibly read Freytag to uphold 
the chief judge’s power to act as the court’s designee in appointing special 
judges, such a model differs in important respects from that which obtains 
at the Supreme Court. Appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, the Chief does not owe his position as such to the 
Court.211 The Chief acts neither as the Court’s agent nor pursuant to the 
 
208 See 28 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (defining the powers of the AO’s director and providing that the 
director shall be “appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the United States, after 
consulting with the Judicial Conference”). 
209 See 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
210 During oral argument, one Justice inquired about the manner in which the chief judge of the 
Tax Court was selected. Appearing for the Government, Deputy Solicitor General (and now Chief 
Justice) John Roberts explained that the “chief judge is elected by the regular judges” of the court. But 
that presented a problem; the Government had taken the position in its brief that the appointment in 
question should be upheld by treating the chief judge as the “head of a department” of the Executive 
Branch. But heads of departments must, according to the theory that animated the Government’s brief, 
be appointed by and answer to the President, rather than to the members of a collegial body. The chief 
judge was not a presidentially selected head, but as Roberts acknowledged, was more like the “head of a 
collegial body” or “a chairman.” Oral Argument at 57:29, Freytag, 501 U.S. 868 (No. 90-762), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_762. That may explain why the 
Court was persuaded to treat the Tax Court as a court of law, as suggested in the amicus brief of Erwin 
Griswold. Justice Scalia’s solution, rejected by the majority but later embraced in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, was to limit the courts of law to Article III courts and to regard the 
multimember Tax Court itself as a department head. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 (2010) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part)).  
211 Scholars have argued that the Constitution does not require that the President choose the Chief 
Justice and have suggested alternative selection modes, including election by the members of the Court 
or rotation in office. See Todd E. Pettys, Choosing a Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative or a Job 
for the Court?, 22 J.L. & POL. 231 (2006). 
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Court’s oversight in performing the appointment duties assigned to him by 
statute.212 
Apart from providing little support for current appointment practices 
of the Chief Justice, Freytag may itself have been decisively reshaped by 
the Court’s later decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Board.213 In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court specifically adopted 
the view (advanced by Justice Scalia in his separate Freytag opinion) that a 
multimember commission could be regarded as a department head for 
purposes of being empowered to appoint inferior officers within the 
meaning of Article II.214 The Court also maintained that the SEC’s 
Chairman could be regarded as acting for the Commission in making 
appointments.215 The Court based this conclusion not on a presumed 
identity between the Chairman and the Commission but on the nature of the 
Commission’s oversight and control of the actions of its Chairman. The 
Free Enterprise Court thus suggests that the practical quality of the 
multimember body’s oversight, rather than a dogmatic presumption of 
identity, will control the evaluation of when an officer acts for a board or 
commission in making an appointment. The Court lacks any comparable 
power over the Chief’s appointments. 
As an alternative to depicting the Chief as acting for the Court, one 
might defend the Chief’s role by characterizing him as the head of a 
department. Congress has occasionally set up new institutions and housed 
them within the Judicial Branch even though they do not exercise the 
judicial power of the United States and play no direct role in the 
adjudication of cases and controversies. Both the AO and the FJC play 
supportive roles in the administration of justice and both lack any direct 
adjudicative role.216 (Similarly, the U.S. Sentencing Commission operates 
within Article III in performing the quasi-legislative task of fashioning 
sentencing guidelines and does so without direct oversight by the Supreme 
Court.) One might depict such agencies as comprising a department of 
judicial administration over which Congress has installed the Chief as head. 
One might defend the Chief’s appointment powers by drawing a distinction 
 
212 Some scholars have suggested that Congress could alter the mode of the Chief’s selection, 
proposing either a rotation based on seniority or a selection by the Court. See Edward T. Swaine, Hail, 
No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 (2006) (suggesting alternative modes for 
choosing the Chief Justice). Obviously, in the wake of such a reconfiguration, the Chief Justice might 
be seen more as the Court’s designee than as an independent actor. 
213 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138. 
214 See id. at 3164 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring in part)). 
215 So long as the Chairman made the appointments subject to the Commission’s oversight, the 
Court agreed to treat the appointments as having been made by the Commission as the head of a 
department. See id. at 3163 n.13 (upholding the Chairman’s appointments on the ground that they were 
made “subject to the approval of the Commission” (quoting Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 
§ 1(b)(2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 568 (2006))). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
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between his judicial role (acting as a member of the Supreme Court) and 
his administrative responsibilities.217 Congress has often assigned 
extrajudicial duties to the Chief; heading the judicial administration 
department could be regarded as such a duty. 
Yet the depiction of the Chief as the head of a separate department of 
judicial administration runs into two related difficulties. For starters, as 
Professor Resnik’s scholarship shows, the Chief may have difficulty in 
maintaining clean lines of separation between the two roles.218 In a broader 
sense, one cannot easily separate the work done by the Article III 
bureaucracy from the fundamental judicial chore of resolving litigated 
disputes. Just as the AO lobbies Congress for new courthouses, new 
judgeships, and new support personnel,219 so too does the FJC provide 
educational and statistical support to federal judges. The close connection 
of all this work to the judicial function raises doubts about whether one can 
really maintain a sharp distinction between what judges do and what their 
supporting administrators do. In the end, everyone in the Third Branch 
works to advance the administration of justice. 
Second, structural constitutional considerations cast doubt on 
Congress’s ability to create a department of judicial administration and 
place the Chief Justice at its head. Recent decisional law and scholarship 
tend to decry the prospect of a “headless ‘fourth branch’” of government,220 
suggesting that any department of judicial bureaucracy should be regarded 
as housed within one of the three traditional branches. For reasons that 
Professor Resnik articulates, one has difficulty in seeing how the work of 
judicial administration could be regarded as an element of either the 
Legislative or Executive Branches of government (here, we should 
distinguish the executive work of the marshal’s office from the work of 
judicial support and administration).221 But even if one were to imagine a 
 
217 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 345 n.12 (referencing a thorough collection of 
scholarly work regarding the Chief’s administrative duties). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
219 In 2011, AO Director James C. Duff and Judge Julia Gibbons, Judicial Conference Budget 
Committee chair, testified in front of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services 
and General Government in support of the judiciary’s budget request of $7.3 billion. In addition to his 
prepared testimony, Director Duff commented: “The one area where we could use additional help is in 
judgeships, particularly in areas of the country that are very overworked.” See Judiciary Warns of 
Impact of Deep Cuts in 2012, THIRD BRANCH (Apr. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
TheThirdBranch/11-04-01/Judiciary_Warns_of_Impact_of_Deep_Cuts_in_2012.aspx. For a general 
introduction to the AO, see supra note 3. 
220 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525–26 (2009) (opinion of Scalia, 
J.) (describing “the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the headless Fourth Branch”). On the 
origins of the term, during FDR’s Administration, see PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., 74TH 
CONG., REP. OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 40 (Comm. Print 1937). 
221 To be sure, the marshal’s service has long been housed in the Executive Branch, indicating that 
nothing prevents Congress from making officers involved in the execution of judicial decrees 
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department of judicial administration within the Executive Branch, it’s far 
from clear that Congress could place the Chief Justice at its head. Such a 
role would not conform to the hierarchical conception of the Executive 
Branch that animates the Court’s recent decisions. 
One finds a clear expression of these values of hierarchy and the chain 
of command in the Court’s most recent application of the Appointments 
Clause of Article II, Free Enterprise Fund.222 There, the Court invalidated a 
provision of Sarbanes–Oxley, which had doubly insulated members of the 
newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board from 
presidential oversight and removal from office.223 More importantly for our 
purposes, Free Enterprise Fund teaches important lessons about the 
appointment implications of a hierarchical branch. On the Court’s view, the 
President’s executive supremacy demands that he retain a measure of 
control over government officers and thus invalidates restrictions that 
insulate such officers from removal. Such invalidation was said to preserve 
what Madison described as the proper “chain of dependence,” through 
which “the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, 
as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.”224 
This hierarchical conception of the Executive Branch, culminating in 
the President, helped to shape the Free Enterprise Court’s definition of a 
“department head” for appointment purposes under Article II. In an 
intriguing feature of the opinion, the Court held that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission—a multimember body—could qualify as a 
department head in which the power to appoint inferior officers could be 
constitutionally vested.225 As the Free Enterprise Court explained, “the 
 
responsive to the Executive Branch of government. But the officers in question answer through the 
chain of command that leads ultimately to the Department of Justice and to the President. See supra 
note 144. Prior to 1939, the budget process for the judiciary was handled by the Department of Justice, 
an awkward state of affairs that provided the impetus for the creation of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts outside the Executive Branch. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, 
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 
1174 (1996); Judith Resnik, Lecture, Courts In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 
788 n.48 (2008). 
222 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
223 The provision in question vested power in the Securities and Exchange Commission, an 
independent regulatory agency, to appoint members of the Board to staggered five-year terms, subject 
to removal by the SEC for good cause. Ultimately, the Court held that the insulation of Board members 
from presidential removal from office violated the constitutional provision vesting executive power in 
the President. Id. at 3155. While the Court did not question the power of Congress to vest executive 
power in an independent agency, such as the SEC, whose members enjoy some insulation from 
presidential removal, the double layer of insulation accorded members of the Board was deemed 
unconstitutional. As the Court explained, the statute “not only protects Board members from removal 
except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good cause 
exists.” Id. at 3153. 
224 Id. at 3155 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
225 In viewing the Commission as a department head for appointment purposes, the Court picked 
up a theme from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Freytag, which had similarly portrayed the 
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Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not 
subordinate to or contained within any other such component, it constitutes 
a ‘Departmen[t]’ for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”226 This 
definition makes clear that department heads must answer, not to other 
officers in the Article II hierarchy, but to the President as the chief 
executive. 
Given this conception of department heads as answering to the 
President, it is not obvious how one could characterize the Chief Justice as 
a department head within the Executive Branch. The Chief, to state the 
obvious, holds his commission during good behavior. He does not report 
to, and cannot be removed from office by, the President. To the extent 
department heads must answer to a constitutional superior, the Chief 
plainly does not qualify.227 
Alternatively, one might portray the Chief as the head of an 
administrative department within Article III, but such an argument poses 
problems of its own. Article III’s vesting clause plays a role similar to that 
in Article II, vesting all of the judicial power in the Supreme Court, and in 
lower federal courts, and requiring all courts and tribunals to remain 
inferior to the one Court. Just as Article III may well invalidate legislation 
 
multimember Tax Court as the head of a department within the meaning of Article II. Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991). As the Court observed, there was nothing particularly anomalous 
about viewing a multimember body as the appointing agency; it specifically noted the example of 
“Courts of Law” in rejecting the notion that only an individual can make appointments under Article II. 
Completing the thought, the Court observed that the organic act vested the SEC’s powers, including the 
power to appoint Board members, in the Commission itself. On this view, the Chairman was not to be 
viewed as the department head. Other Commissioners did not report to the Chairman and, unlike the 
Chairman who was appointed by the President alone, Commissioners were installed in office through 
the usual mode of nomination and Senate confirmation, thus qualifying the Commission as an agency 
head within applicable law. In the end, the Court portrayed the Chairman as exercising executive 
functions “subject to the full Commission’s policies,” rather than as a department head, and upheld the 
Commission as the appointing department head on this basis. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64. 
226 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 (alteration in original). 
227 One might divide the Chief’s judicial and administrative duties and argue that life tenure 
attaches only to the judicial work. Such an approach would map nicely onto the arguments of scholars 
who contend that Congress might restructure the office of Chief Justice in various ways, perhaps by 
assigning the appointment of the Chief to the Court, see Pettys, supra note 1, at 231, 281, or by 
imposing term limits on the Chief’s administrative role, see Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1642. 
Perhaps on the same theory, Congress could subject the Chief’s administrative duties to executive 
oversight and control and thus make the Chief a department head within the meaning of Article II. One 
might argue in support of such an approach that Congress gave the Chief a range of non-Article III 
duties in the early years. See Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 
1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (detailing among other activities Chief Justice Jay’s service on the board of the 
mint and his later appointment as ambassador to Great Britain). While the Chief can plausibly hold 
more than one office under the United States, I find it difficult to imagine a world in which Congress 
could empower the President to remove the Chief from his administrative duties as head of the judicial 
bureaucracy and replace him with a different department head (presumably one of the President’s own 
choosing). The threat to the separation of powers strikes me as fatal to the recognition of such a 
presidential role. 
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that purports to place a lower court beyond the oversight and control of its 
judicial superior,228 so too must officers working for the Third Branch 
remain accountable to their judicial superiors. Article II’s provision for 
appointment of inferior officers by the courts underscores this point. One 
has difficulty seeing how the Chief could be said to be accountable to or 
dependent on the Court in the exercise of his administrative duties. The 
Chief does not serve as the designee or elected representative of the Court 
itself, as in Freytag, and does not submit his appointments to the Court for 
review and ratification. 
To be sure, not every government official involved in some way with 
the administration of justice must answer to the Court. From the early years 
of government, Congress placed the marshals outside the Article III 
hierarchy. Marshals obviously play a role in the execution of judgments, 
serving process, making arrests, and overseeing imprisonment and the 
execution of sentences. Whatever the wisdom of housing the marshals in 
the Executive Branch, the mechanism clearly complies with the “chain of 
dependence” conception articulated in Free Enterprise Fund, with 
dependence running to the President. The example of the marshals thus 
tells us little about Congress’s power to set up a department within the 
judicial bureaucracy and place the Chief at its head. 
One might defend the current arrangement as a functional adaptation 
to the growth and changing nature of the judicial bureaucracy or as a 
reflection of constitutional-moment-style legislation that embodies a 
fundamental change in the constitutional order.229 Chief Justice John Jay 
presided over a Court that appointed two inferior officers, the crier and the 
clerk; court-based appointment did not impose a significant burden on the 
Court or interfere with the Court’s primary function of deciding cases. 
Today, the AO employs more than 32,000 individuals at some 800 
locations nationwide.230 The sheer size of the bureaucracy might seem to 
defy effective court-based oversight, especially for Associate Justices who 
might prefer to avoid administrative chores. But the argument from size 
and complexity does not necessarily argue for sole oversight by the Chief; 
 
228 See Pfander, supra note 23 (contending that the Court’s supremacy entails a power, not subject 
to congressional exceptions, to oversee the work of judicial inferiors); see also PFANDER, supra note 22, 
at 145–52, 163–64 (same). 
229 The argument from functional adaptation recalls the familiar view that the Court should not 
insist on strict adherence to the separation of powers but should instead allow adjustments over time. 
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 857 (1986) (upholding an 
assignment of judicial power to the administrative agency and refusing to articulate “formalistic and 
unbending rules”). For an account of adaptation, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009), proposing that Congress may have power to work around certain 
inconvenient constitutional provisions, particularly where the purpose underlying the provision has little 
continuing relevance. Of course, the argument for the use of workarounds to facilitate adaptation has 
less force when the text in question seeks to achieve a goal that remains relevant. 
230 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013). 
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rather, it argues for delegation to a series of inferior officers who remain 
responsive to their superior in the chain of command. Today, the director of 
the AO serves as the chief administrative officer of the federal judicial 
bureaucracy and as the secretary to the Judicial Conference.231 Court-based 
selection of the director would represent only a limited distraction for the 
Justices and would occur only once every several years.232 
Constitutional-moment arguments owe much to the work of Bruce 
Ackerman and his conception of the New Deal as a moment of engaged 
lawmaking that effected a lasting change in the constitutional order, despite 
the absence of any written constitutional amendment.233 Whatever the 
persuasiveness of Ackerman’s account of the New Deal,234 one cannot 
readily identify a moment in the growth of the judicial bureaucracy that 
would qualify as “constitutional” within the meaning of Ackerman’s 
model. Much of initial growth in the judicial bureaucracy occurred during 
the Progressive Era, under the stewardship of Chief Justice Taft.235 Further 
growth occurred in 1939 with the creation of the Administrative Office.236 
But even then, the director of the AO was to be appointed by the Court.237 It 
was not until 1990 that Congress altered the appointment mechanism to 
vest the appointment power in the Chief.238 Rather than a moment in which 
an aroused citizenry proclaimed a new era in judicial administration (if 
indeed one can imagine such a thing), we have the drip-by-drip accretion of 
 
231 See id. 
232 Since its inception in 1939, eight individuals have served as director of the Administrative 
Office, with an average term of nine years. See id.; Judicial Administration and Organization, FED. 
JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_06_01.html (last visited May 24, 
2013). In appointing the director of the Administrative Office, some Chiefs have played favorites. See 
Fish, supra note 1, at 106–08 (describing Warren’s choice of a “loyal protégé” and Burger’s choice of a 
former colleague and future real estate investment partner with whom he had a “close relationship”). 
233 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (describing 
Reconstruction and the New Deal as periods of heightened citizen engagement and unconventional 
higher lawmaking); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007). 
234 For criticisms, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian 
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002), and Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional 
Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 768 
(1992) (book review), highlighting the problem of identifying when such a moment has occurred and 
what content to ascribe to it. 
235 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 350 (describing the growth of the federal 
judicial bureaucracy and the Chief’s appointment power). 
236 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 937–38 (recounting the legislative impetus behind the creation of 
the Administrative Office); see also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION (1973). 
237 See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, ch. 501, § 302, 53 Stat. 1223 (providing that the 
director and assistant director of the Administrative Office shall be “appointed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States and hold office at the pleasure of and be subject to removal by the aforesaid Court”). 
238 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 307, 104 Stat. 5089, 5112 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)). 
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authority that occurs when the relevant actors no longer attend to 
constitutional limits. 
C. Toward a Court-Based Appointment Process 
Assuming that Congress cannot vest the Chief with power to appoint 
inferior officers, but must vest the power in the Court instead, this section 
explores how Congress and the Court might work together to implement a 
model of court-based appointment. Obviously, the most straightforward 
way to make the transition would be to amend the relevant statutes and 
provide for the vesting of appointment authority in the Court, rather than 
the Chief. Alternatively, the Court could institute an internal practice of 
treating statutes that vest appointment power in the Chief as if they meant 
to confer that power on the Chief as the Court’s agent. In other words, the 
Chief and the Court could institute a practice of overseeing the Chief’s 
appointments such that they could be properly regarded as the Court’s 
work. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court noted that appointments by the 
Chairman of the SEC could pass muster as appointments by the 
Commission itself so long as the appointment is “made ‘subject to the 
approval of the Commission.’”239 Similar approval by the Court could help 
to address any constitutional objection. 
Such a modified appointment practice should not prove particularly 
disruptive, and it could nonetheless considerably improve the process. As 
Professor Ruger has noted, judicial norms call for deliberation, 
consultation, and reason giving.240 It appears that the decision of the 
Framers to vest appointment power in the Court, rather than the Chief, was 
meant to foster these consultative values. Even though the Court did not 
give reasons for the appointment of John Tucker as its first clerk, the Chief 
Justice took pains to ensure that the Court as such engaged in a joint 
deliberative process before announcing its decision.241 We can assume that 
the deliberations focused on the relative merits of the candidates and 
resulted in a consensus selection. Although it would be a drastic step, one 
can imagine that a Justice, doubting the merits of a proposed appointee, 
might file a short dissent, perhaps to highlight procedural concerns. In any 
case, the prospect of group deliberation would impose an important 
discipline on the appointment process, ensuring that the mix of candidates 
 
239 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 n.13 (2010) 
(quoting Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, § 1(b)(2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 568 (2006)). 
240 On the importance of deliberation and collective decisionmaking, see Ruger, Appointment 
Power, supra note 1, at 385–88.  
241 See supra notes 150–51, 154–56 and accompanying text. 
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that the Chief put forward for a particular post or posts would appeal 
broadly to the Justices.242 
Shifting to a court-based appointment process might also improve the 
legislative process by eliminating deliberations that focus on the politics or 
personal character of the incumbent Chief. On at least three occasions, the 
identity of the incumbent Chief appears to have played a role in the 
congressional deliberations over how to vest the appointment power. First, 
in 1867, the political affiliation of Chief Justice Chase appears to have 
persuaded the Republican majority to give him a role in the selection of 
bankruptcy registers.243 Later, in 1910, just one month before his death in 
July, the Senate focused on the fact that Chief Justice Melvin Fuller would 
be exercising power to appoint replacement judges to serve on the 
Commerce Court. Justice Fuller was a genial person, but he presided over a 
Supreme Court that had increasingly drawn the fire of progressives.244 
Progressives sought to shift the appointment power from the Chief to the 
Court, but critics of the proposed amendment criticized proponents for 
casting aspersions on the current incumbent.245 
The identity of the Chief may have also influenced Congress’s 
decision to establish a Special Division of the D.C. Circuit to appoint the 
independent prosecutors specified in the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978.246 Members of Congress close to that curious appointment 
mechanism later explained that the decision to create the Special Division 
was informed, at least in part, by a desire to avoid vesting Chief Justice 
Burger with the power to choose an independent counsel and to place the 
 
242 For an intriguing echo of the argument that the process of appointment differs significantly 
when an administrator submits proposed appointments to the oversight of a larger group, see Free 
Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.12, observing, in the context of an inquiry into standing, that the 
Court “cannot assume, however, that the Chairman would have made the same appointments acting 
alone.” 
243 For an account, see supra text accompanying notes 182–92. 
244 Among the more notorious of the Fuller Court decisions, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905), had come down just a few years before the debate and had been the target of focused 
progressive criticism, see Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of 
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 779–81 (2009) 
(describing the galvanizing effect of Theodore Roosevelt’s 1910 attack on the Lochner decision). For a 
broader view of the Fuller Court, see OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (1993). 
245 See 45 CONG. REC. 7347–50 (1910) (remarks of Sens. Carter, Bailey, and Hale on the subject of 
whether the proposal to switch from the Chief to the Court could be seen as an adverse “reflection” on 
Chief Justice Fuller); cf. id. at 7351 (remarks of Sen. Gore identifying Chief Justice Taney, author of the 
Dred Scott decision, as a Chief who should not be trusted with the appointment power). 
246 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873, 
authorized the Chief Justice to appoint three members of the D.C. Circuit to serve on a Special Division 
that was, in turn, authorized to appoint independent counsel and define the scope of their investigative 
power. On the constitutionality of that appointment device, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), 
upholding the power of the Special Division to make appointments as a court of law, even though the 
appointments in question were to positions in another branch of government. 
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power instead in the hands of such D.C. Circuit judges as David Bazelon 
and Skelly Wright.247 If it were clear that the Court was to make these 
appointments, rather than the Chief, Congress would have little occasion to 
debate the comparative virtues of specific Chiefs or to create elaborate 
statutory workarounds. 
Although one can predict that the Associate Justices may not initially 
embrace their new duties,248 the Court would have some flexibility in 
deciding how far to press for court-based oversight of the Chief’s 
appointment role. The Constitution requires the court to appoint inferior 
officers but does not address the appointment of employees.249 In the 
Court’s view, officers are those who exercise “significant authority” under 
the laws of the United States, while employees act as “lesser functionaries” 
pursuant to the oversight of officers.250 While the line can be a bit 
 
247 See Letter from Abner J. Mikva to author (Jan. 2012) (on file with the Northwestern University 
Law Review) (confirming the story that Democratic members of the House distrusted the Chief Justice 
and created a Special Division in part to place the power to appoint independent counsel in other 
hands). 
248 See Letter from Peter G. Fish to author 1 (July 19, 2012) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review) (recounting a conversation with Justice Brennan in which the Justice 
“emphatically rejected” any role for the Associate Justices in the selection of administrative personnel 
on the ground that the Chief was obliged to shoulder all “administrative burdens”). For further evidence 
of Associate Justice antipathy to sharing the Chief’s administrative chores, see Conference on the 
Office of Chief Justice (Oct. 15, 1982), in THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 155, 168, 
describing Associate Justice McKenna as preferring to be left totally out of administrative work. 
249 The inapplicability of Article II to the appointment of employees likely means that the practice 
of permitting each Justice to appoint law clerks and other staff does not present a constitutional 
problem. For an account of the practice, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: 
THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 42–44, 190–205 (2006), contrasting 
the role of law clerks as stenographers in the late nineteenth century with their more expanded role on 
the Rehnquist Court. Some might argue that the clerks now exercise real power in the decision of cases, 
both in recommending action to their Justices and, through the cert. pool, in shaping the Court’s docket. 
See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1290–95 (2010) (arguing that Congress should strip the Court of its law 
clerks and force the Justices to do their own work). But law clerks propose and Justices dispose, making 
it hard to argue that the clerks occupy inferior offices that require full-Court participation in the 
appointment process. Notably, the first Justices to hire law clerks paid for them out of their own 
pockets, a fact that tends to support their characterization as employees rather than inferior officers. See 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His Clerks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 163, 165 (2010) 
(recounting the practice of Horace Gray, the first Justice to hire a law clerk). 
250 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3160 (2010) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976) (per curiam)). The Court put it this way in a leading 
statement: 
[I]n the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important 
Government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is 
directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). Under guidance issued by the Office of Legal 
Counsel, officers of the United States include only those individuals who hold an office that is both 
“continuing” and that has been delegated a significant portion of the “sovereign” power of the nation. 
See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 
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unclear,251 the Court can obviously refrain from playing any role in the 
appointment of lesser functionaries. Settled law pretty clearly establishes 
the clerks of the Supreme and district courts as inferior officers; the Court 
treated its clerk as such, and the decision in Ex parte Hennen so regards the 
clerks of the district courts.252 In addition, the Court held that special judges 
of the Tax Court were inferior officers within the meaning of Article II, as 
are the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that 
figured in the Free Enterprise Fund decision.253 Presumably, such 
precedents suffice to establish that prominent figures in the judicial 
bureaucracy, such as the director of the AO, qualify as inferior officers for 
whom court-based appointment should be the norm. Hiring practices at 
lower levels in the bureaucracy need not change. 
As with employees, the Court’s appointment obligations would not 
necessarily extend to decisions about how to designate judges for special 
judicial service. Here, one must distinguish between the initial appointment 
of Article III judges, which has conventionally been thought to require 
presidential nomination and senatorial advice and consent, and the 
designation of current Article III judges to play a special role within the 
Judicial Branch.254 Such designation of existing judges does not obviously 
entail the appointment of a new inferior (or principal) officer.255 After all, 
the judicial office as understood today includes both the adjudication of 
cases and controversies as a member of a specified court and the 
performance of additional tasks in accordance with proper designations. 
Such additional tasks, as we have seen, could potentially include service on 
a wide range of Judicial Conference committees as well as service on a 
court of specialized jurisdiction. Rather than filling offices, the Chief’s 
 
16, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf. On such a view, 
the range of employees subject to appointment without regard to Article II would be quite broad indeed. 
251 Thus, the Court acknowledged that the status of administrative law judges, as officers or 
employees, remains a matter of dispute. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10. 
252 See supra text accompanying note 176. 
253 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.  
254 Some scholars have contended that lower court judges could be regarded as inferior officers, as 
befits their status as the judges of inferior courts. If adopted, such a view could presumably clear the 
way for the appointment of inferior federal judges by the Court itself, as Professor Burke Shartel 
contended some years ago. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, and 
Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1930) (arguing that one 
might characterize lower court judges as inferior officers within the meaning of Article II, thereby 
clearing the way for their appointment by the Supreme Court). For an update of Shartel’s analysis in 
light of recent cases, see Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and 
Advice and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 824–39 (2006). 
255 Congress has instituted an elaborate process of designation and assignment that governs the 
eligibility of senior judges. For an account, see Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 19–21. 
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designation of judges might well be viewed as specifying what immediate 
duties, out of a range of possibilities, the judge should perform.256 
This conception of designation conforms to early practice under the 
1850 statute that first conferred power on the Chief Justice to identify a 
judge from an adjoining district to assist in the case of judicial disability. 
There, Congress specifically conferred on the Chief the power to 
“designate and appoint” a judge for the purpose.257 But it was clearly 
understood that the Chief was to select from among current Article III 
judges in making the designation, rather than to appoint new judges to 
provide assistance. Similarly, when Congress returned to designation in the 
creation of a Commerce Court in 1910, the initial appointment of judges 
was to be made by the President and the Senate; the Chief’s designation 
power came into play only after the initial five-year term for initial 
appointees had run its course.258 In both cases, the designation mechanism 
relied on initial presidential appointment and authorized the Chief to assign 
existing Article III judges to the positions in question. Designation may 
thus be best understood as specifying the work of an Article III judge, 
rather than as the appointment of an inferior officer. On this basis, the 
Court might well leave intact a wide range of designation authority now 
exercised by the Chief.259 
The Court’s deference to the Chief’s designation of judges might 
extend to such specialized courts as the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation and the FISA courts. To be sure, judges designated for service on 
such courts exercise the judicial power of the United States, performing the 
core work of overseeing the resolution of cases and controversies. In that 
sense, their designation does not differ from other designations, such as 
those to address disabilities or temporary workload dislocations. On the 
other hand, designation to a specialized court poses a risk that the Chief 
 
256 Congress can impose new duties on an existing officer without running afoul of Article II so 
long as the new duties can be considered “germane” to the work already being performed by that 
official. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 171–75 (1994); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 
U.S. 282, 300–01 (1893). It follows a fortiori that the designation of particular duties from an 
established range would not present Appointments Clause problems. But cf. David R. Stras & Ryan W. 
Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (arguing that the office of 
senior judge would require a separate appointment and that the oversight entailed in designating and 
assigning senior judges represents an unconstitutional abridgement of judicial independence). 
257 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra text accompanying note 196. 
259 On the other hand, the simple fact that the Chief designates a sitting Article III judge to fill an 
available post does not necessarily address all concerns. It strikes me as relatively easy to maintain that 
specialized judicial work, such as that on the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, represents 
simply one more element of the core judicial responsibility of adjudicating cases and controversies. But 
some designations, such as those of sitting judges to serve as director of the AO or FJC, see supra notes 
2–3, would occasion a marked departure from the business of adjudication. In taking up the new task, 
the director more closely resembles an officer with new executive responsibilities than a judge on 
temporary assignment to a new judicial venue. 
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will be perceived as staffing the court with judges who favor a certain 
approach to the legal questions likely to come before the tribunal. Critics 
have suggested, for example, that Chiefs in the past have favored relatively 
conservative designees for the FISA court, Republican judges for the 
Special Division, and judges open to procedural reform for the civil rules 
committee.260 A collegial designation process would go far to blunt such 
criticisms.261 
One final challenge lies in drawing the line between offices to which 
the Chief can make designations and those to which he makes new 
appointments. Obviously, deliberations at the Court could help to inform 
this line-drawing puzzle. But at least two factors might help to distinguish 
designative offices, which the Chief can fill alone, from appointive offices. 
If the office requires the exercise of judicial power and can only be filled 
by an Article III judge, the argument for treating it as a designation seems 
relatively straightforward. If Article III judges and others can both serve in 
an office, such as a membership on the civil rules advisory committee or 
the directorship of the AO, then the argument for regarding the 
appointment as a mere designation seems harder to sustain. If the office 
entails the exercise of law- or policymaking power, then the argument for 
regarding it as the sort of inferior office that the Court itself must oversee 
becomes harder to resist. 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Jay’s scrupulous adherence to a court-based appointment 
model sharply contrasts with a modern practice that treats the Chief as the 
presumptive appointing authority. Like many functional adaptations to the 
growth of the federal government, the Chief’s new role as the head of a 
judicial bureaucracy has its defenders. One can certainly sympathize with 
arguments from administrative efficiency, and can predict that the Court 
might not welcome the burden of sharing the Chief’s administrative 
portfolio. Yet the Court’s own decisions refuse to allow arguments from 
convenience to trump the lines of accountability sketched out in the 
Constitution’s appointment provisions. As the Court recently reaffirmed, 
“[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the 
hallmarks—of democratic government.”262 
It seems likely that the courts were installed as the appointing entity to 
put fences around the patronage power of chief judges and to ensure that 
offices were to be viewed as part of a public trust for distribution on the 
 
260 See supra notes 4, 48–50 and accompanying text. 
261 See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 101 (noting the importance of ensuring that any designation 
process for senior status judges take account only of genuine administrative needs and not be tainted by 
personal animosity or political considerations). 
262 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)). 
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basis of merit after due consultation. Granted, we do not need to police 
Judicial Branch appointments to ensure democratic accountability; the 
people play at best an indirect role in the choice of the Article III judiciary 
and the exercise of the judicial power. Yet a growing body of evidence 
suggests that hierarchy plays an important role in the structure of the 
federal judiciary, with one Supreme Court sitting atop a federal judicial 
pyramid. While no one would insist that the Court adjudicate every case or 
controversy or approve every appointment in the Third Branch, the 
structural imperatives of hierarchy call for the Court to participate in or 
oversee adjudication and significant appointment decisions involving 
inferior officers. Such oversight would honor the Court’s supremacy and 
the Article II provision for appointments by the “courts of law.” 
 
